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Abstract 
 
In this dissertation we investigate different aspects of capital regulations and their 
impact on the behavior of commercial banks. In chapter two, we foucs on the impact of 
capital regulations on risk-taking of commercial banks in developed and developoing 
countries separately and togahter. We find that such regulations indeed reduce the risk 
taking of commercial banks. At the same time, we examine the relationship between 
capital ratios and risk taking. In line with previous literature, we find that this ratio is 
negative also. Further examinations including the degree of liberalization and the level of 
finanicl development did not yield conclusive results.  
 
In chapter three, we examine the relationship between the capital regulations and 
total lending and total depositis. We do not find conclusive evidence in support of the 
‘credcit crunch’ or the ‘ risk retrenchment’ hypothesis. However, several important 
variables do show a tendency to change with capital ratios. As a result, changes in capital 
ratios in response to regulations do have important impact on bank lending and decision 
making.  
 
In chapter four, we study five South East Asian countries within the context of the 
crisis of 1996. First we test for the existence of depositor discipline in these countries and 
find that the sate of such discipline is very weak even after such a huge crisis. We also 
test the degree of risk taking in the banking industry in these countries. Evidence shows 
that perfect competition prevails in the bankins secotr. We also try to establist the link 
between “the index of depositor discipline” and “index of competition”. But we don ot 
find evidence in support of this.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Bank Regulations, Depositor Discipline, Risk Taking, Basel Capital 
Regulations, Credit Crunch. 
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Chapter 1. Overall Introduction 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine several issues in banking that most 
bank capital regulation papers omit—namely, the impact of Basel I-like national capital 
regulations on capital adequacy ratios, and changes in the risk-taking behavior of banks 
in developing countries. To analyze these issues, we examine as much as 30 developed 
and developing countries in Chapter 2.  
Another area omitted by the literature is the degree of depositor discipline 
experienced by banks in five South-east Asian countries (i.e., Indonesia, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) during the Asian Crisis of 1997; changes in the risk-
taking behavior of banks before and after that crisis, as well as the link between risk-
taking and depositor discipline, is examined. The last area studied here is the impact of 
capital regulations on bank lending, which is popularly known as a “credit crunch.” 
The central theme in examining the first two topics is the risk-taking behavior of 
banks, and it is one of the core areas of Basel I (signed in 1988) that focuses on the 
“measurement and management of risk-taking in commercial banks.” This agreement has 
emerged as one of the most successful international banking accords of the 1990s. Based 
on the success of Basel I and to remedy some of the limitations of Basel I, the Basel 
Committee initiated Basel II in 2004; it will soon be implemented by the G10 and several 
other countries.  
Basel II specifically outlines the three pillars of modern banking: capital 
regulations, depositor discipline, and regulatory supervision.1 The chapters of this 
dissertation are directly related to two of the most important areas of contemporary 
banking regulations under Basel II, and the findings herein may contribute to better 
policy-making, especially in the context of developing countries.  
Chapter 2 of the dissertation comprises a study of the impact of Basel I-like 
capital regulations on both developed and developing countries. The basic framework of 
the analysis will be to examine the changes in capital ratios of undercapitalized banks in 
response to capital requirements, and then to examine the relationship between changes 
                                                 
1 Pillar 1 describes the regulatory capital for credit, operational and market risk; pillar 2 gives supervisors 
the discretion to increase regulatory capital above pre-defined limits, if necessary; pillar 3 allows market 
discipline to operate by providing information to the public.  
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in capital ratios and risk. In the second step, we attempt to expand the evidence derived 
from the initial step, into four areas: depositor discipline, liberalization, regulatory 
restrictiveness, and financial development. We also attempt to examine how banks react 
to capital regulations given changes in those four areas.  
Chapter 3 examines the popular “credit crunch” literature. Evidence supports the 
existence of a “credit crunch”; Chiuri et al. (2001), for example, provide evidence of a 
“credit crunch” in 12 developing countries. Central to the related literature are 
examinations of whether the adoption and implementation of capital requirements curtails 
the credit supplies of banks or not. Whereas the present study examines both developed 
and developing countries, most studies to date have examined this relationship on a 
country-by-country basis, with a special focus on the 10 OECD countries. Our study will 
encompass evidence from a larger sample that includes both developed and developing 
countries, and we will concurrently look to Peek and Rosengren (1998, 1997) and Berger 
and Udell (1994) to examine the impact of capital regulations on loan supply from banks. 
Finally, chapter 4 reviews the state of depositor discipline in five South-east 
Asian countries between 1996 and 2004; bank risk-taking behavior between 1992 and 
2004, with a focus on changes in such behavior in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis; and 
the link between depositor discipline and risk-taking behavior. Four alternative asset 
quality measures are used to examine the impact of a decline in these measures on growth 
of inflation-adjusted deposits. In order to examine risk-taking behavior and 
competitiveness, we use the two most widely accepted models to measure changes in 
bank risk-taking (competitiveness) before and after 1997, namely the Shaffer (1993) 
model and the Panzer and Rosse (1982, 1987) methodology. This combination is rarely 
used in the existing literature. As a final step in this study, we examine the link between 
depositor discipline and bank risk-taking (competitiveness), in light of Gruben et al. 
(2003).   
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Chapter 2. Impact of Basel I-Like Bank Capital Requirements on Bank 
Credit Risk 
 
In 1988, all the OECD countries, as well as Switzerland and Luxemburg, signed 
the Basel I Accord (capital adequacy regulations). It was implemented during a three-
year period, from 1990 to 1993. During the 1990s and 2000s, the Accord emerged as the 
landmark document for bank capital regulations and supervision in about 100 countries, 
both developed and developing. Evaluation studies have shown that the regulation did 
increase the capital ratios of all banks in developed countries, including undercapitalized 
banks. These studies also found a weak negative relationship between capital ratios and 
the risk-taking of banks, indicating that the improvement of capital ratios of 
undercapitalized banks was not accompanied by a concomitant increase in risk.  
At present, there is a dearth of literature on the impact of such regulations in 
developing countries. Most of the previous studies are of a single-country nature and are 
not cross-sectional. Critics caution that developing countries have very different banking 
histories, structures and environments; those countries also differ from developed 
countries in their levels of government intervention in banking, degrees of governmental 
bank ownership, degrees of bank liberalization, levels of privatization vis-à-vis state-
owned banks, degrees of regulatory forbearance, and in their institutional set-ups and 
other socio-economic factors that affect banking operations. Therefore, in the present 
study, we examine the reaction of banks in developing countries to Basel I-like capital 
regulations.  
Recent increases in the number of bank crises around the world2 have renewed the 
interest of professional policy makers and academia in identifying the determinants of 
such crises. Several studies3 on the determinants of bank crises have already identified 
regulatory changes as a major factor. It is instructive to assess the impact of capital 
regulations on bank risk-taking behavior and on the relationship between capital ratios 
and bank risk-taking. This is the primary focus of the present study.  
                                                 
2 The IMF and World Bank published comprehensive studies in 1996 that show that a full three-quarters of 
their membership had experienced significant banking problems between 1980 and 1996.  
3 Kaminsky (1999) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).  
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Literature Review 
The literature begins, in earnest, with Shrieves and Dahl (1992), who use several 
periods of cross-sectional data on commercial banks in the United States, under the two 
equation ( capital equation and risk equation) simultaneous equations framework. They 
found that the effectiveness of risk-based capital regulations depends on how well the 
regulations reflect the true risk exposure of banks. 
The results of studies by Aggarwal and Jacques (1997, 2001) on U.S. banks are 
not easy to interpret. Samples selected for these studies are from 1991-1993 and 1991-
1996 respectively. Both of these samples coincide with the passage and implementation 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) in December 
1991. Prompt Corrective Action (PCA), contained in Section 131 of FDICIA, went one 
step further than the Basel I Accord by defining three regulatory ratios (the Basel capital 
standards plus an advantage requirement) and five categories in which banks are 
classified according to their compliance with the three ratios. The impacts of Basel I and 
PCA under FDICIA therefore overlapped for U.S. banks, and it is thus difficult to ascribe 
the findings of the two papers by Aggarwal and Jacques (1997, 2001) to the Basel I 
Accord alone. However, if one were interested in implementing such regulations with a 
concomitant hardening of the central bank’s behavior, then the results remain valid. Thus 
the authors find that undercapitalized banks increased their capital target ratios more 
quickly than banks that had higher initial capital.  
The study by Jacques and Nigro (1997) deals exclusively with the consequences 
of the Basel I Accord, as it concentrates on the years 1990-91, which is the period before 
the FDICIA was passed. Their finding was in line with those of Aggarwal and Jacques 
(1997, 2001); however, the problem inherent in this study is the very low number of 
undercapitalized institutions in Jacques and Nigro’s sample – less than 2 percent of the 
total number of banks, which may reduce the reliability of some of their estimates.  
Following studies present non-U.S. evidence regarding the relationship between 
capital ratios and credit risk. Ediz, Michael, and Perraudin (1998), employ confidential 
U.K. data, including detailed information about the balance sheets and profit and loss 
accounts of all British banks, from 1989 to 1995. It uses a limited-information technique 
that differs from that of the Shrieves and Dahl (1992) framework mentioned earlier, and 
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they found evidence that capital regulations were effective in increasing the capital to 
meet the minimum standard. Unfortunately, Ediz et al.’s model leads to a puzzling 
conclusion: banks are adjusting their capital levels each year by more than the difference 
between the current level and the target they have in mind, which means that banks are 
overshooting their targets (and by more and more each year).  
The study by Rime (2001) is interesting, because it provides the first application 
of the Shrieves and Dahl (1992) model to non-U.S. banks during 1989-1996. His results 
indicate that Swiss banks reacted to capital regulations by increasing their capital, but that 
this did not change banks’ risk-taking behavior. One of the possible problems with this 
study is that Rime adopted the PCA regulatory classification to measure regulatory 
pressure on Swiss banks; this may be inappropriate, given that the additional 
requirements set out by PCA have not been formally adopted by any country other than 
the United States.  
Patrick Van Roy (2003) studies banks in seven G10 countries (Canada, France, 
Italy, Japan, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States) in a panel data set for the 
1988-95 period, and achieved similar results. Godlewski (2004) studies the response of 
banks in 30 emerging market countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Asia, and South 
America to such regulations; his results corroborate the existing findings for banks in 
developed countries, and also show that regulatory, environmental, and legal milieu play 
important roles in bank capitalization and credit risk-taking behavior in emerging market 
economies.  
To assess the impact of deposit insurance and regulatory restrictiveness on the 
effectiveness of capital regulations, studies by Demirguc-Kunt et al. (1999, 2001) and 
Barth et al. (2000) are examined. Demirguc-Kunt et al. provide evidence that explicit 
deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability, especially when bank interest 
rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak. Evidence provided by 
Barth et al. (2000) indicates that a positive relationship exists between the degree of 
regulatory restrictiveness and banking sector fragility. 
We summarize the finding of the articles discussed in the review section, as 
follows: these articles generally support the idea that undercapitalized banks increased 
their capital adequacy ratios in the first half of the 1990s; a similar trend was observed for 
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well-capitalized banks, but to a lesser extent. However, there is little consensus among 
the reviewed literature that banks, whether adequately capitalized or not, engaged in 
riskier activities because of changes to capital regulations.  
Based on the background presented above, in the present study, we analyze the 
following: (i) the change in actual capital ratios in response to regulatory minimum 
capital ratios of banks; (ii) the relationship between change in risk and change in capital 
ratios to examine if the increase in capital ratios came at the cost of higher risk-taking or 
not; (iii) impact of different important elements on the relationship between change in 
risk and change in capital, which include: liberalization ( foreign direct investment as a 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product(GDP); bank activities restrictiveness index ; 
different characteristics of deposit insurance schemes; and domestic credit as percentage 
of GDP.  
The present study differs from other/previous studies in several ways: (i) the data 
is a panel data of developed and developing countries; and (ii) we extend the existing 
literature, more specifically the study of the relationship between capital ratios and risk 
across different dimensions, liberalization, bank activities restrictiveness index, different 
deposit insurance schemes, and domestic credit as percentage of GDP. 
 
Empirical Models 
In the model utilized, observed changes in bank capital ratio and portfolio risk 
levels are broken down into two components: (i) discretionary adjustment and (ii) 
changes caused by an exogenously determined random shock. Therefore, observed 
changes are  
tjEtjCAPRAT
d
tjCAPRAT ,,, +∆=∆     (2.1) 
tjtj
d
tj URISKRISK ,,, +∆=∆         (2.2) 
where tjCAPRAT ,∆ and tjRISK ,∆ are the observed changes in capital ratios and risk levels 
for bank j in period t, respectively. tjd CAPRAT ,∆  and tjd RISK ,∆ represent discretionary 
adjustments in capital ratios tjCAPRAT ,  and risk levels, respectively. tjE , and tjU ,  are 
exogenous shocks. Banks may not be able to adjust to their desired capital ratios and risk 
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levels instantaneously; thus, following Shrieves and Dahl (1992), the discretionary 
changes ( tjd CAPRAT ,∆  and tjd RISK ,∆ ) in capital and risk are modeled using a partial 
adjustment framework, which allows for changes in discretionary capital and risk in this 
period, t, to be proportional to the difference between the target levels in period, t, and the 
levels existing in period t-1.  
)( 1,
*
,, −−=∆ tjtjtjd CAPRATCAPRATCAPRAT α     (2.3) 
)( 1,
*
,, −−=∆ tjtjtjd RISKRISKRISK β     (2.4) 
 
where tjCAPRAT ,* and tjRISK ,* are bank j’s target capital and risk levels at time 
t, respectively. 1, −tjCAPRAT  and 1, −tjRISK are bank j’s actual capital and risk levels at 
time t-1, respectively. We assume 1,0 << βα .  
Substituting equations (2.3) and (2.4) into equations (2.1) and (2.2), respectively, 
the observed changes in capital and risk can be written as: 
tjtjtjtj ECAPRATCAPRATCAPRAT ,1,
*
,, )( +−=∆ −α     (2.5) 
))( ,1,
*
,, tjtjtjtj URISKRISKRISK +−=∆ −β     (2.6) 
  
In equations (2.5) and (2.6), the observed changes in capital and risk in period t 
are functions of the target capital and risk levels, the lagged capital and risk levels, and 
any exogenous factors. Target capital and risk levels are not directly observable, but they 
.are assumed to depend upon some set of observable variables.  
In line with Aggarwal and Jacques (1998) and Jacques and Nigro (1997), this 
study argues that target capital ratio – CAPRAT* in equation (2.5) – depends on a number 
of explanatory variables, including the size of the bank (SIZE), bank’s income (ROA), 
investment in government bonds (BONDS), and liquidity of assets (LIQUIDITY). 
Similarly, target level of risk – RISK* in equation (2.6) – depends on SIZE, loan-loss 
reserves (LLOSS), BONDS, and LIQUIDITY. Moreover, SIZE and ROA variables were 
taken from Shrieves and Dahl (1992). On the right hand side of the equations we put the 
change in capital ratios ( CAPRAT∆ ) and change in risk ( )RISK∆ for capital and risk 
equations respectively.  
 8
To develop the model fully, we add additional variables and categorize the 
variables thus: (i) Regulatory Dummy Variable, (ii) Bank-Specific Variables, (iii) 
Country-Specific/Macro-economic Variables, (iv) Year Dummy, (v) Deposit Insurance, 
and (vi) Regulatory Restrictiveness. All the variables mentioned in the previous 
paragraph fall under the Bank-Specific Variables category. We describe each of these 
variables in detail below.  
A list of these variables, with expected signs, is presented in the Appendix to this 
Chapter (Appendix A – Chapter 1). The complete model is also presented at the end of 
this section as equations (2.7) and (2.8). Following Aggarwal and Jacques (1998) and 
Jacques and Negro (1997), we estimate the two simultaneous equations with three stage 
least square technique.  
Regulatory Dummy Variable (REG_DUM). Different studies have formulated this 
regulatory pressure dummy in different ways. The main idea is to create a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one for undercapitalized banks (those whose actual capital 
ratios are lower than the regulatory minimum) and a value of zero for adequate or 
overcapitalized banks (those whose capital ratios are equal to or higher than the 
regulatory minimum). In the present study, we will follow Van Roy (2003) in 
constructing this variable; the advantage of such a construction is that it accounts for the 
following: the level below which banks should be regarded as undercapitalized and hence 
influenced by capital ratios; and the size of the gap between the bank’s capital ratio and 
the threshold level, which will reflect the magnitude of regulatory pressure experienced 
by such banks.  
We set up the dummy (REG) to be equal to the difference between the regulatory 
minimum capital ratio (THR) and the actual capital ratio when the bank is 
undercapitalized. For overcapitalized or adequately capitalized banks, the dummy takes a 
value of zero.   
⎩⎨
⎧ <−=
otherwise
THRifCARCARTHR
REG
0
 
Banks having capital ratios lower than the regulatory minimum are classified as 
undercapitalized, and those with capital higher than the regulatory minimum are 
classified as over or adequately capitalized.  
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We expect to find a positive and significant coefficient for this variable in the 
CAPRAT equation (2.5), indicating that regulatory pressure compelled the 
undercapitalized banks to increase their capital ratios. In the RISK equation (2.6), we 
expect to find an insignificant coefficient for this equation, indicating that such capital 
regulations did not result in an increase in risk-taking activity on the part of banks. 
Bank-Specific Variables. Following Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Aggarwal and 
Jacques (2001), we select the following variables. We exclude ROA from the RISK 
equation (2.6) and LLOSS from the CAPRAT equation (2.5) to make the system exactly 
identical. The reasons behind the expected signs are explained below.  
Natural logarithm of bank’s total assets (SIZE). Following Jacques and Nigro 
(1997), Aggarwal and Jacques (1998), and Van Roy (2003), natural logarithm of total 
assets, SIZE is included because larger banks have better access to capital markets. So, 
they have lower risk. Therefore, we assume that SIZE has a negative relation with both 
the target level of capital and risk. This is also related to the “too big to fail” hypothesis.  
Bank’s profitability (ROA). ROA is included in the equation, because profitable 
banks may prefer to increase capital through retained earnings rather than through equity 
issues. Studies by Jacques and Nigro (1997), Aggarwal and Jacques (1998), and Van Roy 
(2003) all include some variant of such a variable. The variable is expected to have a 
positive relationship with capital ratio.  
Current loan loss provisions to potential bad loans (LLOSS). Following Van Roy 
(2003), we include LLOSS. This variable is deducted from outstanding loans and will 
therefore lead to a decrease in risk-weighted assets. Thus, a negative relationship will 
exist between target risk and loan loss provisions for bad loans.  
Ratio of government securities to total assets (BONDS). Banks with a higher 
percentage of government securities can be expected to have higher capital ratios through 
the sale of securities. As Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) point out, if banks with large 
holdings of government securities retained – rather than sold – these securities during a 
falling rate environment, then they may need lower levels of capital to comply with 
existing regulations. At the same time, banks with high ratios of government securities in 
their asset portfolios will be exhibiting lower levels of risk. Thus, we proceed with the 
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assumption that both capital and risk are inversely related to a bank’s holding of 
government securities and bonds.  
Ratio of liquid reserves to total assets (LIQUIDITY). Banks with relatively higher 
liquidity ratios are faced with less risk and, hence, need to hold less capital; such banks 
may be willing to increase their levels of risk. Therefore, we assume that a negative 
relationship should exist between the ratio of liquid reserves to total assets and the level 
of a bank’s capital, and that a positive relationship between this ratio and the level of a 
bank’s portfolio risk should exist.  
Country-specific/macro-economic variables (GDP_GROWTH, INFLATION, and 
EXCHANGE_RATE) 
We include three variables – inflation, exchange rate and per-capita GDP growth 
rate – to control for country-specific heterogeneity. We expect these variables to be 
significant, indicating that the difference between the banking environments across 
countries is important to the success of capital regulations. We followed Chiuri et al. 
(2000) and include these variables to control for country-specific heterogeneity.  
Year Dummy (YEAR)4The interaction term between the REG and the year dummy 
variables was used to examine the impact of capital regulation on actual capital ratio and 
risk across time. We expect these variables to have significant and positive signs on the 
capital ratio equation (equation (2.7)). On the other hand, in the risk equation, they should 
have negative signs or be insignificant, indicating that the implementation of capital 
ratios did increase the risk-taking of commercial banks (equation (2.8)).  
Deposit Insurance (DEP_INS). These variables reflect the characteristics of the 
deposit insurance scheme of a country. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2001) finds that some of 
these characteristics are positively related to the probability of a financial crisis. In an 
earlier study into the determinants of a banking crisis, Demirguc-Kunt et al. (1998) found 
that explicit deposit insurance positively correlated with the probability of a banking 
crisis. Kane (1989) attributed the U.S. Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s to three 
                                                 
4 Van Roy, 2003. 
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factors: generous deposit insurance, financial liberalization, and regulatory failure. All 
three of these factors encouraged excessive risk-taking and subsequent default.5 
Our variables were taken from the World Bank Survey of Bank Supervision 
(2003). Following an approach similar to that of Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2001), three 
variables are included for deposit insurance. We will create a dummy variable based on 
the following criteria: (i) the existence of deposit insurance, (ii) a method of funding 
deposit insurance (i.e., government, banks or both), and (iii) a change in insurance fees, 
in response to changes in the banks’ risk positions. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2001) already 
used the first two variables to find that when deposit insurance exists and when the 
government funds it, probability of banking crisis increases.  
We expect these variables to be negatively related to capital ratios and positively 
related to banks’ risk-taking. We argue that the stronger the insurance scheme, the less 
interested the banks will be in undertaking the painful and costly measures of 
implementing capital ratios. We expect to find negative and significant coefficients for 
these variables in the CAPRAT equation, but the banks will have a higher incentive to 
take on more risks. When banks receive assurance from the government that parts of any 
financial losses will be covered by an insurance fund, they become reluctant to halt 
increases in risk-taking. We expect to find positive and significant coefficients for the 
corresponding variables in the RISK equation.  
We will run the two-equation system (i.e., equations (2.5) and (2.6)) three times, 
alternatively using each of these dummy variables as specifications and checking to see if 
the coefficient of the dummy variable is of the desired sign or not.  
Regulatory Restrictiveness (REG_RES). We use this variable vis-à-vis degree of 
restrictiveness of banks’ activities, as created and used by Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(1999, 2001, and 2002). Based on a cross-section of 45 countries, Barth et al. find that the 
higher the level of restriction on a bank’s activities, the higher the probability of a bank 
                                                 
5 As Demirguc-Kunt et al. (1998) points out, there are two views regarding the impact of deposit insurance. 
According to the first view, deposit insurance should enhance the financial stability of the banking system 
by putting an end to depositor runs. According to the second view, however, it can create moral hazards. As 
a bank’s ability to attract deposits no longer reflects the risk of its asset portfolio, the bank is encouraged to 
finance high-risk, high-return projects. If banks take on risks that are correlated, then systematic banking 
crises may become more frequent. Based on empirical evidence, one can claim that the second view is 
more dominant role, especially where institutional frameworks are underdeveloped and regulatory 
supervision is weak.  
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crisis. However, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) find the opposite: that a banking 
crisis is more likely to occur when countries have liberalized their commercial banking 
sector, even after controlling for other country characteristics. They also find that the 
probability of such crisis declines by the presence of a strong institutional environment 
represented by rule of law, low levels of corruption, and good contract enforcement.  
In order to explore the relationship between restrictiveness of the banking sector 
and implementation of bank regulations, we follow the method of Barth et al. (2002). We 
will code restrictiveness in each of the four lines of non-traditional business (i.e., 
insurance, real estate, securities, and ownership of non-financial firms) first. The codes 
are 1 = unrestricted, 2 = permitted, 3 = restricted, and 4 = prohibited. Then we form a 
composite index of overall restrictiveness across all activities by taking the average of the 
scores associated with individual activities. We insert the variable in the two-equation 
system (equations (2.5) and (2.6)) and check to see if the coefficients are of the desired 
sign.  
We expect to find that if banks are less restricted, they will find it easier to meet 
capital adequacy ratios without taking higher risk; they have the opportunity to diversify 
into different businesses and thus avoid risk. We therefore expect to find a positive 
relationship between this variable and CAPRAT in equation (2.5). In the RISK equation 
(2.6), we expect to find that this relationship will be negative, indicating that higher 
diversification leads to lower risk.  
It can nonetheless be argued that financial liberalization may also result in an 
increase in risk-taking, especially when there is lack of prudent regulation and supporting 
institutions to ensure effective supervision. Mehrez and Kaufmann (1999), Glick and 
Hutchison (2001), Arteta and Eichengreen (2002), and Noy (2004) find evidence to 
support this. 
Foreign Investment as Proxy for Liberalization (FINV). It should be pointed out 
that all of the countries included in the sample underwent considerable privatization (i.e., 
reducing government ownership) and liberalization (i.e., allowing foreign entry) 
throughout the 1990s, as part of the structure of their adjustment programs.6 However, 
                                                 
6 Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) were sponsored by donor agencies like the World Bank and IMF 
throughout the 1990s, and implemented in many developing countries. The SAP policy package had 
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liberalization in the financial services obviously took different forms in different 
countries. Notwithstanding these diverse liberalization measures, allowing the entry of 
foreign banks and ownership by foreign banks were key components of liberalization 
programs. Such measures led to changes in the structure and operation of, and 
competition in, the domestic financial services industry. Such changes may have affected 
the relationship between risk-taking and capital adequacy requirements; hence, to control 
for this change, we include as one of the variables in the model annual foreign 
investment, as a percentage of gross domestic product. The coefficient of this variable 
will show us the impact of changes in foreign investment on capital ratios and 
commercial banks’ risk-taking.   
Level of Financial Development (FDEV). In accordance with the existing 
literature, we use domestic credit from the banking sector as a percentage of GDP as a 
measure of a given country’s level of financial development. Because we use an 
unbalanced-panel dataset, we are able to infer how the relationship between risk-taking 
and capital adequacy changes with fluctuations in the financial sector’s level of 
development. This is important in the context of developing countries, where we cannot 
take the existence of a well developed and sustainable financial sector for granted.  
The variables discussed thus far are presented via the following two equations. 
Equation (2.7) has change in capital ratios as the dependent variable, and equation (2.8) 
has change in risk as the dependent variable. Full descriptions of the expected signs are 
presented in Appendix A – Chapter 2, at the end of this chapter.  
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elements covering policy reforms in many areas, such as financial institutions, financial markets, trade 
reforms, currency reforms, and revenue policy reforms.  
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The system is defined in such a way as to take account of interdependence 
between capital and bank risk-taking (i.e., change in RISK in the CAPRAT equation and 
change in CAPRAT in the RISK equation). As a result, we estimate the model in two 
steps: first we estimate each of the equations separately with 2SLS, and then we estimate 
them simultaneously with 3SLS estimation technique. Summary of expected signs of the 
important variables are presented in Appendix A at the end of this chapter.  
A sample of countries, together with dates of adoption and implementation of 
capital regulations, is given at the end of this chapter. Data comes from several sources 
(IMF-IFS database, WDI online, 2005; Bank scope, 2005), and Table I of Appendix B, 
shows the capital ratios for 10 OECD countries. Table II outlines the adoption of the 
Basel I Accord between 1988 and 2002 and Table III provides a summary of the previous 
studies in the field. Our sample will be based on Table IV (-a, -b, -c). In Table IV-a, we 
merge the earlier samples of Chiuri et al. (2000) and IMF Working Paper WP/05/38 to 
create our own sample in the fourth column. Table IV-b shows a breakdown of developed 
and developing countries, and Table IV-c gives a year-by-year breakdown. In column (3) 
of this latter table, a three-year window is shown, and in column (4) a five-year window 
since the date of adopting the Accord.  
 
Empirical Findings 
Data for macro-economic variables come from WDI online 2005, whereas data 
for bank-specific variables come from the Bank Scope 2005 database. Table I in the 
empirical appendix at the end of this chapter, presents summary statistics of the sample, 
with the first three left-hand columns presenting data for all banks. This data shows 1,622 
bank-year observations from all countries. Of this total, 330 are from developing 
countries and 1,336 from developed countries (they do not add up as they come from two 
separate files). The last three columns of Table I show data for undercapitalized 
countries. In total, there are 258 undercapitalized bank-year observations, out of which 51 
are from developing countries and 223 from developed countries.  
The most important variables for this study are total capital, total capital ratio, 
tier-1 capital and tier-1 capital ratio. The averages for total capital and tier-1 capital for 
all countries are 2,447,330.37 and 1,496,010.02 thousand United States dollars (USD), 
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respectively. The corresponding figures for developing countries are 828,195.91 and 
756,397.18 thousand USD, respectively, while for developed countries, the figures are 
2,819,642.79 and 1,709,857.54 thousand USD, respectively. For total capital and tier-1 
capital ratios, the figures for all countries are 13.56 and 11.04 percent, respectively; for 
developing countries, 14.42 and 11.58 percent, respectively; and for developed countries, 
13.42 and 11.40 percent, respectively. This finding is surprising, because developing 
countries have higher average capital ratios than their counterparts in developed 
countries.  
The total capital ratio and tier-1 capital ratio of undercapitalized banks in all 
countries are 5.35 and 1.42 percent, respectively. For developing countries, the 
corresponding ratios are 2.24 and -1.04 percent respectively, whereas for developed 
countries, they are 5.82 and 2.68 percent. Clearly, there is an urgent need to study these 
banks and their behaviors as they operate amidst divergent economies and policy regimes 
over time.  
Tables 2.2-a, 2.2-b and 2.2-c, present 3SLS estimates on the models of two 
simultaneous equations system (equations (2.7) – capital equations and (2.8) – risk 
equations). Each model has two equations, namely the capital and risk equations. Each 
model is presented in a pair of columns in Tables 2.2-a, 2.2-b, and 2.2-c (for example, 
columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.2-a present one model). Two models for total capital are 
presented in the first left-hand column: one using Van Roy’s dummies and another for 
simple dummies representing undercapitalized banks. Two models in the last four 
columns are for tier-1 capital. Again, two sets of dummies are used. To elaborate, the first 
header row shows whether total capital or tier-1 capital was used. The second header row 
shows the equation name (i.e., capital or risk equation), while the third header row shows 
the dummy variable being used to identify the undercapitalized banks (Van Roy or 
simple dummies).  
Table 2.2-a-measures the estimates for all countries, Table 2.2-b for developed 
countries only, and Table 2.2-c for developing countries only.  
Relationship between Capital Ratio and Risk. The change in risk variables in 
capital equations and the change in capital variables in the risk equations has a negative 
and significant coefficient in each of the equations of all the models, which is expected. 
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Table 2.2-b and 2.2-c present similar results for developed and developing countries. All 
coefficients are negative and significant.  
The sign and significance of these coefficients are similar to the findings of 
Jacques (1998), Van Roy (2005), and other studies within the context of developed 
OECD countries. The key highlight of the present study is its provision of evidence 
showing that the relationship also holds across developing countries, not just developed 
countries. As a result, this study expands the evidence into a cross-country context where 
national banking sectors are heterogeneous.  
Impact of the Basel I Accord on Capital Ratios. The focus is on the capital 
equations in each pair of Tables 2.2-a to 2.2-c. Table 2.2-a shows that the coefficients of 
the regulation dummy is significant and positive in all models; this too is expected – it 
shows that overall, across all developing and developed countries, Basel and similar 
national capital regulations did have a positive impact on the capital ratios of 
undercapitalized banks. These banks were forced to increase their capital ratios in the 
face of pressure from regulatory agencies. In addition to this, Table 2.2-a shows that this 
is true for both total and tier-1 capital.  
For developed countries, Table 2.2-b shows that the coefficient of the regulatory 
pressure dummy was positive and significant only for models with total capital. Such was 
not the case for tier-1 capital, and this warrants further explanation. OECD countries 
officially started to adopt the 8 percent total capital requirement and 4 percent tier-1 
capital requirement at year-end 1992, but even before that, they imposed these ratios on 
their respective banks. Van Roy (2005) points out those banks in OECD countries reacted 
to and reached the required ratios of the Basel I Accord in 1989. It is thus possible that 
much of the response of undercapitalized banks occurred before the five-year sample 
period of this study (1992 to 1996). Furthermore, in the initial stages, the national 
monetary authorities of OECD countries put more emphasis on core capital build-up, 
which explains the insignificant coefficients in the risk and capital equations.  
Evidence with respect to developing countries is, of course, equally important. 
Table 2.2-c shows that all the coefficients of regulatory pressure dummies in capital 
equations were significant and positive, which again implies that undercapitalized banks 
were forced to increase both total and tier-1 capital, due to capital regulations.  
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These results, taken together, explain the popularity and widespread application of 
regulations across many different countries.  
Impact of the Basel I Accord on Portfolio Risk. In the risk equations in Table 2.2-
a, we have only one significant and negative coefficient for the simple dummy variable 
and tier-1 capital. In the case of developed countries (Table 2.2-b), we find the 
coefficients to be negative and significant in three out of four alternate models, which is 
desirable. This implies that increases in the capital ratios of undercapitalized banks were 
not accompanied by a concomitant increase in risk.  
Such is not the case for developing countries (Table 2.2-c). There, the coefficients 
are significant, but positive in the total capital and tier-1 capital models only with Van 
Roy’s dummies. This indicates to an increase in risk-taking activities in the wake of 
implementing capital regulations. However, in the models with simple dummies, the 
coefficients are insignificant, but these results do not hold across all models.)   
Impact of Liberalization. Table 2.2-a does not show significant coefficients for 
this variable in any capital or risk equations, save for the last column. There, the 
coefficient in the risk equation is negative, which implies that liberalization results in 
reduced risk-taking on the part of banks.  
Table 2.2-b shows that the variable has negative and significant coefficients in all 
four capital equations, but in risk equations, only one coefficient is significant (i.e., total 
capital).  
In Table 2.2-c, the coefficients are positive and significant in terms of both the 
risk equations for total capital, but this does not hold for tier-1 capital.  
From this evidence, we can conclude that in developed countries, higher 
liberalization is associated with lower bank capital ratios. This may be explained as a 
result of liberalization, where banks enjoy different options to raise capital when needed, 
hence the reduced urgency to raise capital ratios.7 In developing countries it higher 
liberalization is associated with more risk also in one of the models. The evidence is 
nonetheless weak. Other results do not hold across different specifications; 
                                                 
7 It can be also be argued that liberalization should make it relatively cheaper for banks to raise capital, 
compared to a relatively more restrictive regime; hence, the variable should be positively related to capital 
ratios. This study’s evidence does not favor this argument.  
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Impact of Financial Development. Table 2.2-a shows that the coefficients of the 
risk equations for total capital models are both negative and significant, implying that as 
a percentage of domestic credit to GDP increases, risk-taking by banks decreases. For 
tier-1 capital models, we get similar results, but only for the model with a simple dummy 
variable.  
Table 2.2-b derives ambiguous results for the impact of proxy for financial 
development variable in developed countries. The risk equations for the two tier-1 capital 
models have negative and significant coefficients, but for the total capital model, the risk 
equations with simple dummy variables show a positive and significant coefficient for 
this variable. Coefficients in the other equations are not significant.  
For developing countries (Table 2.2-c) there is no significant coefficient in any 
equation.  
Regulatory Dummy and Year Interaction. Table 2.3 presents evidence regarding 
the interaction of the dummy variable and successive years within a five-year window. 
Here, there are no consistent results. Coefficients are significant and positive for total 
capital and simple dummy equations in years one, three, and four. For tier-1 capital and 
simple dummy equations, the coefficients are again significant and positive, in years one 
and three. This provides weak evidence that undercapitalized banks continue to adjust 
their capital ratios throughout the five-year window following the adoption of capital 
regulations. Signs for risk equations are also inconsistent.  
Impact of Restrictiveness of Banking Activities. In Table 2.4, we present evidence 
regarding the relationship of capital ratios and the risk and effectiveness of capital ratio 
regulations, within the context of restrictions imposed by central banking authorities (see 
the last row of the Table 2.4). We change the basic model (Tables 2.2-a to 2.2-c and 
Table 2.2) by dropping the undercapitalization dummy variable and alternatively 
inserting the index of restrictiveness. This is one of the alternative modifications of the 
equations 2.7 and 2.8.  
Column (3) of Table 2.4 shows that there is a negative and significant coefficient 
for index of restrictiveness in the risk equation. This means that the higher the value of 
the index (i.e., the more restrictiveness the regime is), the lower the level of risk-taking 
on the part of banks. This findings supports the evidence of Mehrez and Kaufmann 
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(1999), Glick and Hutchison (2001), Arteta and Eichengreen (2002), and Noy (2004), but 
all the coefficients of the capital equations were nonetheless insignificant. For the capital 
equation in column (4), the variable is likewise not significant.  
Impact of Deposit Insurance Schemes. Columns (4) and (5) of Table 2.4 present 
results for the depositor insurance dummy variable. It takes a value of one if the country 
has a deposit insurance scheme and zero if it does not. The coefficient of the depositor 
insurance dummy is positive and significant in the risk equation, which means that 
countries that have depositor insurance experience higher risk-taking on the part of its 
banks. This supports the “moral hazard” hypothesis regarding bank behavior, as 
explained by Demirguc-Kunt et al. (1998, 2001).  
In columns (6) to (9) of Table 2.4, we present the results for the second depositor 
insurance dummy variable. These results focus on the question, “Is depositor insurance 
funded by the government, the banks, or both?” We create three dummy variables, with 
each taking a value of one when the condition is met, and zero otherwise.  
Although the results are not presented here, we do not find significant coefficients 
when the insurance program is funded by the government. When it is funded by the 
banks, however, we find that the banks’ risk-taking declines and the coefficient of the 
dummy is negative and significant in column (7). However, it is positive and significant 
in column (6), which suggests that the capital ratios of banks increase when depositor 
discipline is funded solely by the banks.  
In columns (8) and (9) of Table 2.4, the coefficient is significant and positive, 
indicating that when the depositor insurance scheme is funded by both the banks and the 
government, the banks have a tendency to take on more risk. This is in line with the 
findings of Demirguc-Kunt et al. (1998, 2001), who found that full government funding 
is associated with a higher level of bank crisis. In contrast, our evidence is from bank-
level data, indicating a reduction in risk-taking by banks if they bear part of the burden of 
financing the insurance.  
The last two columns (columns (10) and (11)) of Table 2.4 represent the dummy 
variable, which asks the question, “Do deposit insurance fees charged to banks vary, 
based on some assessment of risk?” If the answer is “yes,” then the dummy takes a value 
of one; if “no,” then it is zero. We do not have a significant coefficient for the variable in 
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the capital equations, but in the risk equation, we have a negative and significant 
coefficient. This has important implications, as it indicates that if insurance fees are 
indeed tied to some measure of risk, then banks tend to take on lower risk.  
 
Conclusion 
Evidence presented in the paper supports the view that capital and risk are indeed 
inversely related to one another. At the same time, evidence shows that Basel and similar 
capital regulations are successful in both developed and developing countries, in the 
sense that the undercapitalized banks in these countries are forced to increase their capital 
ratios. Evidence also suggests that such a positive improvement is not at the cost of 
higher risk. Evidence regarding the change or risk and capital ratios of undercapitalized 
banks is ambiguous.  
Likewise, evidence regarding liberalization and financial development in 
developing countries is ambiguous, but in developed countries, we find that a higher 
degree of liberalization is associated with lower capital ratios. Again, for same countries, 
we find that a higher degree of financial development results in a lower amount of risk-
taking by banks. This aggregate evidence, however, is not robust across different 
specification of the models.  
At the same time, evidence supports the view that in relatively more restrictive 
environments, banks abstain from taking higher risks. As for depositor discipline, there is 
evidence supporting the following conclusions: (i) when depositor insurance exists, it 
creates incentives for banks to take on higher risks than they would otherwise take, 
(ii) when such insurance schemes are funded by banks themselves, banks take on less risk 
and also tend to hold more capital, (iii) if such insurance schemes are funded by both the 
government and the banks, banks tend to take higher risk than would otherwise be the 
case, and (iv) when the premiums of such insurance schemes are tied to some 
measurement of risk, banks again show a tendency to take less risk. These findings 
illustrate some of the desirable characteristics of bank deposit insurance schemes being 
implemented in different parts of the world.  
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Chapter 3. The Impact of the Basel I Accord on  
Credit Expansion in Developing Countries 
 
The G10 countries adopted and implemented the Basel I Accord in 1988 and 
1990-1993, and central bank authorities in different countries around the world started to 
implement national versions of the Accord throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. The 
primary objective behind such a worldwide acceptance was to promote the soundness of 
the national financial system, to “catch up” with the international banking standards in 
the wake of financial liberalization and integration, and to foster economic growth with 
the help of a better-functioning financial system.  
During the 1990s and early 2000s, several concerns were raised by academia and 
financial practitioners around the world about several adverse impacts of the Basel I 
Accord, like capital regulations on the banking system of host countries in particular, and 
consequences in terms of the economy as a whole. Over the years, this debate took the 
form of two key questions (IMF, Survey): What is the reaction of banks’ behavior to such 
an Accord, which entails a capital charge of the risks they take? What is the impact of 
such changes in their behavior with respect to lending? The second question is central to 
what is now popularly called the “credit crunch” literature.  
The previous chapter of this dissertation primarily examined the impact of 
regulatory capital ratios on actual capital ratios and risk taking of banks. But in the 
present study, we examine a different and related field, namely, the impact of capital 
regulations (minimum capital requirements) from different point of views: (i) the lending 
behaviour of banks; (ii) several variables representing equity; loan; and profitability; and 
(iii) risk sensitivity of loans.  
 
Literature Review 
If banks face a constraint of capital for the loans they want to make, they must 
raise new capital. Nonetheless, asymmetric information and “lemons” problems may 
prevent them from issuing new capital. Myers and Majluf (1984) point out that banks 
may prefer to shrink rather than issue new equities, due to asymmetric information and 
“lemons” problems. Holmtrom and Tirole (1997) provide evidence revealing the 
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importance of capital as determinants of investment, monitoring, and interest rates, and 
the importance of capital in terms of macro-economic implications, especially with 
regard to banks. As a result of such difficulties associated with raising new capital and 
the concomitant importance of the role of capital in the decision-making of banks, banks 
may decrease lending in response to capital regulation. This is the central argument of the 
“credit crunch” literature.   
Notwithstanding the above argument and evidence on “credit crunch,” banks may 
respond positively to capital requirements and increase – rather than decrease – capital 
and bank lending. To date, a substantial body of literature has dealt with this issue. 
Recent work by Chami and Cosimano (2001) reveals that banks are more likely to 
expand its lending to meet pent-up demands for credit, and risk punishments from other 
banks. 
Using the data from the states and form New Jersey during 1991-1992, Bernanke 
and Lown (1991) demonstrated that loan growth at individual banks during the 1991-
1992 was positively linked to initial capital ratios. They also find evidence that declines 
in bank capital have contributed to the slowdown in lending, which is consistent with 
‘capital crunch’ hypothesis. However, they cautioned that the magnitude of the effect is 
not insignificant but also not extremely large either. Peek and Rosengern (1995) find the 
similar evidence of “credit crunch” for similar period of time by focusing on bank 
deposits. In addition, the results of several studies on Japanese banks (Ito & Sasaki, 1998; 
Kim & Moreno, 1994; Who, 1999; Honda, 2002) show that the result of Basel I on Japan 
was similar to that on the United States.  
Berger and Udell (1994) investigate the impact of risk-based capital adequacy on 
credit crunch in the United States as well as some alternative explanations of credit 
decline of early 1990s. They compared how bank portfolios changed in the early 1990s 
from the 1980s and how these changes were related to key variables related with risk 
based capital and other variables (large banks, banks with weaker capital ratios, and 
banks supervised by the OCC). Their findings indicate that the risk based capital related 
credit crunch hypothesis fares the worst of all the alternative explanations of the bank 
credit reallocation of the 1990s. On the other hand, macro-regional effects dominate the 
other factors behind the credit decline.  
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With respect to emerging market countries, Chiuri et al. (2002) argue that the 
introduction of higher minimum bank capital requirements may well induce a contraction 
of bank credit, and aggregate slowdown. Their sample includes 16 emerging countries, 
10 of which experienced both regulatory change and financial crises; another five were 
non-crisis countries. This study confirms the existence of “credit crunch.” Nonetheless, 
Barajas et al. (2005) did not find strong evidence of a Basel-induced credit crunch in 
Latin America.  
Watanabe (2004) analyzes the impact of prudential regulation in slowing down 
credit expansion, countering the effectiveness of monetary policy in stimulating 
economic conditions in Japan. Stagnation in Japan persisted during the last decade 
despite monetary easing, as evident by “zero interest rate policy” since February 1999, 
which proved to be ineffective.  
Over the years, several scholars have studied the impact of capital regulations 
intensively. Aggarwal and Jacques (1997, 2001) and Jacques and Nigro (1997) deal 
exclusively with the impact of such regulations on the risk-taking behavior of commercial 
banks and changes in capital ratios. One of the major objectives of Basel was to increase 
the capital ratios of undercapitalized banks; these studies on developed countries find that 
the basic relationship between risk-taking and capital ratios were negative and that such 
regulations did, in fact, increase the capital ratios of undercapitalized banks. Van Roy 
(2003) later found evidence that risk-taking by commercial banks and capital ratios were 
negatively related in developing countries, confirming earlier findings of the literature. 
Hussain and Hassan (2004) find similar results, and also find that the impact of Basel I 
fell short of expectations (i.e., did not increase the capital ratios of banks).  
As already pointed out, many developing and emerging market countries have 
adopted and implemented (or are at different phase of implementing) a national capital 
regulation regime. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the principles of Basel I have 
emerged as the core principles of capital regulation regimes around the world, but data on 
implementation years and stages throughout the world was relatively scarce and remains 
scattered.  
The objective of the present study is to examine the impact of the implementation 
of Basel I-like capital requirements on bank lending in emerging market countries. We 
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expand upon previous empirical analysis in several ways. First, our sample consists of a 
larger sample of emerging market countries and not just an individual country, as is the 
case with existing literature. Second, we focus on identifying supply-driven credit 
restrictions by utilizing data on individual banks that are active in each sampled country, 
rather than on country-level data. (The use of such bank-wise disaggregated data is not 
common in the literature.) Third, we use a model that examines both external and 
regulatory shocks to bank capital. Fourth, we use the frameworks of Peek and Rosengren 
(1995) and Berger and Udell (1994). The former’s framework is used to test the short-run 
impact of Basel I; the latter’s framework, being of a long-run nature, is used to examine 
the time dimension of risk-based capital, and it thus allows us to test the structural change 
regarding banks’ overall loan supplies. Finally, because banking sectors from emerging 
market countries differ from one another in many respects, we take into account 
international (as well as inter-temporal) dimensions with the help of panel analyses, and 
by including control variables for year and macro-economic effects. 
 
Model Description 
To fulfill the objectives of this paper, we need first to identify the countries in the 
emerging market region who adopted the Basel I Accord, and make note of when it was 
adopted. We rely on IMF (2003) and World Bank surveys of bank regulations for this. 
We construct a database of individual banks from 1987 to 2004, to test for structural 
changes vis-à-vis banks’ overall loan supplies.  
The “capital crunch” hypothesis envisages that poorly capitalized banks will 
decrease deposits more rapidly than better capitalized banks, holding the loan demand 
effects constant (Peek & Rosengren, 1995). We adopt the following equation from Peek 
and Rosengren (1995) and Chiuri et al. (2000) to test the hypothesis. (For details, please 
see Appendix C – Chapter 3.) Instead of utilizing bank-specific dummy variables in these 
studies, we propose the use of countrywide dummy variables (given by vector X) to 
account for countrywide heterogeneity.  
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dDτ/Aτ-1 = a0 + a1TCτ-1/Aτ-1 + (a2+a3TCτ-1/Aτ-1)dTCτ/Aτ-1 + a4log(Aτ) + a5log(ROAτ)  + 
a’jX + a’iDyτ +εD        (3.1) 
with τ = (t-1, t, t+1),          
 
dLτ/Aτ-1 = b0 + b1TCτ-1/Aτ-1 + (b2+b3TCτ-1/Aτ-1)dTCτ/Aτ-1 + b4log(Aτ) + b5log(ROAτ) + 
b’jX + b’iDyτ +εL        (3.2) 
with τ = (t-1, t, t+1),          
 
Superscript “d” represents change over the previous period. The variables TC 
represent total capital, D represents total deposit and L indicates total loan. These are 
normalized by the beginning of period assets, to reduce the potential heteroscedasticity 
problems with the error term. This is widely used in the literature. εD and εL are normal 
i.i.d. random errors in the deposit and loan equations, respectively.  
The vector Dyτ consists of year dummies, which use the year preceding the 
enforcement as a reference category. This controls for year-wise heterogeneity of the 
panel data set. As bank-specific variables, we include both log (A) (as the natural 
logarithm of the total assets of banks) and ROA (or the return on assets).  
The coefficient a2 captures the effect of a change in initial total capital over total 
assets on current deposit, over initial total assets where log of total assets and 
country/time varying act as controls. The impact of a change in total capital on current 
deposit over initial capital is shown by a3 for undercapitalized banks. 
In the second equation, b2 represents the impact of a change in the ratio of initial 
total capital over total assets on current loan over initial total assets. As with the first 
equation, the coefficient b3 measures the same impact but for an undercapitalized bank.  
In the next step, the time dimension of risk-based capital is examined by using the 
framework of Berger and Udell (1994). We implement the two modifications of the 
original Berger and Udell (1994) approach, as proposed and adopted by Barajas et al. 
(2005). The first modification involves longer sample period compared to the original 
Berger and Udell (1994) approach, which places emphasis on the longer-term impacts of 
Basel I. In the second modification, Barajas et al. (2005) examine both the composition 
of bank assets and the real growth rate of loans.  
 29
In order to assess whether there is a significant change in means between the pre- 
and post-Basel periods in bank capital and lending, we initially regress each variable on 
an intercept variable:  
Vijt = BASELYRjt         (3.3) 
 
Vijt represents the ratio of equity to total assets (EQTA), total capital ratio. 
(TOTCAPRAT), the ratio of net loans to total assets (NLOANTA), the real annual growth 
rate of loans (RLOANGROWTH), return on assets (ROA), and net interest margin (NIM). 
Sub-indices i, j, and t stand for bank, country, and year, respectively, and BASELYR is a 
dummy variable for the adoption year of each country.  
In line with the approach taken by Barajas et al. (2005), we run the following 
tests: (i) an OLS regression across countries and time, (ii) a fixed-effect regression with 
bank-specific intercepts, (iii) a regression that includes only country dummies, and (iv) a 
regression that includes a relative measure of financial development, FINDEV, as well as 
its interaction with BASELYR.  
In the next step, we utilize a specification similar to Berget and Udell (1994) and 
Barajas et al. (2005), in order to test if loan supply declined in the wake of the 
implementation of Basel regulations. Bank loans are assumed to respond to lagged risk 
factors; if risk increases, banks decrease their lending activity. As a result, it can be 
argued that banks with higher levels of risk would tend to adjust by having a smaller loan 
portfolio on average, compared to safer banks. This is the “risk retrenchment” hypothesis 
discussed by Berger and Udell (1994).  
We examine the following model to work with the hypothesis: 
Vijt =α0+α1BASELYRjt+α2RISKijt-1+α3BASELYRjt.Riskijt-1+α4Xj   (3.4) 
 
We alternatively use two dependent variables: the loan-asset ratio (NLOANTA) 
and growth rate of loans (RLOANGROWTH). Also included are three risk measures: 
capital ratio (EQTA), the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans (NPFRAT), and a 
proxy for credit risk measure (RWATA) (i.e., risk-weighted assets divided by total 
assets)8. Our macro-economic controls are the real growth rate of GDP (to capture 
                                                 
8 This measure of credit risk was adopted from Roy (2003) and Hassan (2005).  
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changes in loan demand), and the annual change in the inverse money velocity (to 
capture shifts in the public’s demand for bank deposits). This is calculated as the absolute 
annual change in the ratio of money and quasi-money to GDP.  
The coefficient of BASELYR*RISK (α3) measures the impact of the Basel I 
Accord on the marginal impact of risk. A positive value for this coefficient will imply 
that banks decreased loans even more in response to a drop in capital, which will confirm 
risk retrenchment. For the other variable measuring risk (the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans), a negative value of α3 will imply that banks contract loans in 
response to a rise in credit risk. If the value of coefficient α1 is negative, then we can 
conclude – regardless of their risk characteristics – that banks in the emerging market 
countries experienced a loan contraction following Basel. 
 
Empirical Findings 
 Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the important variables used in 
Chapter 3. Table 3.2 presents the estimates of equations (3.1) (column (2)) and (3.2) 
(column (3)), based on a fixed effect with bank-specific intercepts. Column (2) of the 
table shows that the sign of the coefficient of the change in total capital, divided by the 
total assets variable ( 11 / −− ττ AdTC ), is significant and positive. This implies that a change 
in deposit scaled by total assets is positively associated with a change in the bank capital 
endowment.  
For the interaction term between total capital and change in total capital – each 
scaled by total assets ( 111 /*/ −−− ττττ AdTCATC ) – we find a negative and significant 
coefficient; given the set-up of the Peek and Rosengren (1995) model, this coefficient 
implies that as the interaction term increases for undercapitalized banks, the total deposit 
divided by total assets of the last period decreases.  
Column (3) of Table 3.2 presents the estimates of equation (3.2). In this case, we 
find both the coefficients of total capital divided by total assets and the interaction 
variables are significant and positive. As a result, we do not find in this case evidence to 
support a “credit crunch.”  
 31
In summary, evidence by way of these models and in support of the “credit 
crunch” remains ambiguous. This contradicts the findings of Chiuri et al. (2000), who 
found evidence in support of the “credit crunch.”  
In Table 3.3, several alternative dependent variables are presented across the 
columns: EQTA, TOTCAPRAT, NLOANTA, RLOANGROWTH, ROA, and NIM. Each 
panel presents different models: panel a: Year Dummies Only; panel b: Country 
Dummies Only; panel c: Countries and Year Dummies (Country Dummies Not 
Presented); panel d: Fixed Effects with Bank-Specific Intercept; Panel e: Financial 
Development Model; and Panel f: Financial Development Model Without Interaction.  
The focus here is on the significant and signs of the dummy variable BASELYR, 
which takes a value of zero before and one after the dummy variable is implemented. In 
panel a, we present the model for the time dummy variables. We find significant and 
negative coefficients in the EQTA, NIM, and RLOANGROWTH columns, which means 
that these variables declined in value in the aftermath of implementing such regulations. 
On the other hand, ROA has a positive sign, which means that ROA increased after the 
implementation of capital regulations.  
In panel b, we present models with country dummy variables. Here, we find 
significant and positive coefficients for the EQTA and TOTCAPRAT columns. On the 
other hand, for NLOANTA, RLOANGROWTH, ROA and NIM columns, the coefficients 
are negative.  
In panel c, we present models for country and year dummies; here, there are 
negative and significant coefficients for the RLOANGROWTH and NIM columns.  
Panel d presents models with fixed effects and bank-specific intercept. We have 
negative and significant coefficients for the EQTA, NLOANTA, RLOANGROWTH, ROA, 
and NIM columns.  
Panel e presents models with financial development variable. We have positive 
coefficients in the EQTA, TOTCAPRAT, and ROA columns. 
Panel f presents a model with a financial development variable model, with 
interaction term. We have negative and significant coefficients for NLOANTA, but in the 
TOTCAPRAT and ROA columns, we have positive and significant coefficients.  
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Let us now present the above findings in terms of variables. EQTA is positively 
associated with BASELYR in panels b, d, and e, but it is negatively associated with 
BASELYR in panel a. As a result, it is concluded that capital regulations have a positive 
impact on equity of banks – that is, the mean of post-Basel equity was higher than that of 
the pre-Basel era. The same conclusion can be obtained for TOTCAPRAT in panels a, b, 
d, e, and f. It does appear that Basel and Basel I-like capital regulations did have the 
desired impact on the banks.  
Let us examine the “credit crunch” literature in terms of NLOANTA and 
RLOANGROWTH. RLOANGROWTH is negatively associated with BASELYR dummy 
variables in panels a, b, c, and d. On the other hand, NLOANTA is negatively associated 
with BASELYR dummies in panels b, d, and f; thus, we do find evidence of a decrease in 
these loan-related variables in the aftermath of Basel, indicating a supply-driven “credit 
crunch.” These findings are in line with those of Barajas et al. (2005).  
Based on aforementioned evidence, we can claim that overall, Basel and similar 
capital regulations resulted in changes of all the included bank specific variables. Given 
that these variables play a significant role in banks’ important decision-making, it can be 
expected that such regulations profoundly impacted the behavior of banks. This assertion, 
too, is in line with the findings of Barajas et al. (2005).  
In Table 3.4, we present results for tests of the “risk retrenchment” hypothesis. 
The impact of the Basel I Accord on risk sensitivity will be measured by the interaction 
between BASELYR and the respective risk variable. If banks experienced risk 
retrenchment after Basel, then the coefficient of the interaction term should be positive in 
the EQTA model and negative in the NPFRAT and RWATA models. As mentioned, we 
use two alternate dependent variables (NLOANTA, or total loan to total asset ratio, and 
RLOANGROWTH, or growth rate of loans). Two variations of the models are presented: 
one with macro-economic variables, and another without.  
For the total loans to total assets ratio (column (2)), we find a negative and 
significant coefficient for capital ratios. This is unexpected evidence against the “risk 
retrenchment” hypothesis. If banks’ lending become more sensitive to risk after adopting 
capital regulations, the coefficient should be positive. This, however, is not the case; we 
find that bank lending becomes less sensitive to capital ratios. However, when we use the 
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net-problem loans to total assets ratio and risk-weighted assets as a proxy for credit risk, 
we get expected results: the signs here should be negative, and indeed they are. So, in this 
case, the banks’ contract loans change even more in response to a rise in credit risk in the 
aftermath of capital regulations. This supports the “risk retrenchment” hypothesis.  
In columns (3) and (5), we use RLOANGROWTH as a dependent variable. For 
risk measured with capital ratios, we find positive and significant coefficients; this is 
expected. On the other hand, for the non-performing loans to total assets ratio, we do not 
find a significant coefficient. For risk-weighted assets, we find positive and significant 
coefficients; this is unexpected and runs counter to the “risk retrenchment” hypothesis. 
Therefore, for this part of the analysis, we find only limited support for the “risk 
retrenchment” hypothesis. There is limited evidence in support of both the “credit 
crunch” and “risk retrenchment” hypotheses, which is, in line with the findings of Barajas 
et al. (2005). Tallman et al (2000) also found similar evidence for Australian Banks for 
the period 1986 to 1993. But Berger et al (1994) did not find evidence of “credit crunch”. 
They found limited evidence in support of “risk retrenchment.”  
 
Conclusion 
Based on the findings presented in this section, we find limited evidence of “credit 
crunch” in the aftermath of adopting Basel I. Given that our sample consists of both 
developed and developing countries, this finding is important, as “credit crunch” had 
been previously observed only in the United States and in Scandinavian countries in the 
early 1990s.  
Next, we used a cross-section dataset to conduct a mean-test to determine if the 
Basel I Accord had a significant effect on bank activities. The mean-test indicates that the 
Accord had a significant impact on bank activities (i.e., bank capital increased in the 
wake of adoption of the Accord, loans scaled by total assets and the growth rate of loans 
decreased for the same period). As a result, we find that the Accord was successful in 
raising the capital ratios and equity of banks, paving the way for the financial soundness 
of commercial banks. At the same time, we find further evidence of “credit crunch.” 
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In the final step of the study, we find limited evidence supporting the “risk 
retrenchment” hypothesis. We find that the loans-total assets ratio is negatively related to 
credit risk – that is, ratios of problem loans to total assets and risk-weighted assets to total 
assets. With respect to loan growth rate, we find it is positively related to capital ratio.  
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Chapter 4. Depositor Discipline and Bank Risk-Taking Behavior: 
Evidence From the 
 South-East Asian Financial Crises  
 
 In the wake of successful regulatory changes in the developed countries9, many 
developing countries started to liberalize their financial sectors in the 1990s. In spite of 
their initial success, the liberalization policies now face a backlash in several developing 
countries. Critics present the cases of international financial crises (the Mexican Crisis in 
1995 and the Asian Crisis of 1997) and domestic crises (Japan in the late 1990s and 
Turkey during the early 2000s). The argument centers on the timing, pace and the ways 
in which such policies were implemented. These have renewed the profession’s interest 
in the issues of competition and stability in the banking sector.   
One consequence of liberalization and privatization in the banking sector of 
developing countries was that it increased competition in the banking sector of the host 
countries, as documented by IMF (1998) and several other studies.10 Liberalization 
opened up the banking sector to open competition by the private, foreign and even 
government banks. This paved the way for increased risk taking.  
Malaysia, Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and Philippines faced such situations since 
the starting of the 1990s. The focus of the present study is to follow that episode with 
focus on 1997 Asian crisis. More specifically we indent to examine the changes in risk 
taking behavior of banks before and after 1997. In addition to risk taking behavior of 
banks we will examine evidence of depositor discipline in the after math of 1997 crisis. If 
depositors punish banks when quality of assets of commercial banks decline, then we 
claim that there is evidence of depositor discipline. But if this is not the case when we 
claim otherwise.  
                                                 
9 In the European Union the major regulations that opened up ways for changes in the banking sector is the 
Second Banking Coordination Directive of European Union allowing the Single Banking License in 1991. 
For 10 OECD countries, the Basel I Accord of 1988 initiated a change towards stricter capital requirements 
for banks. In the USA, several regulations were implemented during the 1990s starting with the Basel I 
Accord, followed by the FDIC Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 (emphasis on adequate capitalization 
of banks and allowing special privileges, or eligible operations, for banks deemed to be well-capitalized), 
the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 (allowed interstate banking), and the Financial Sector Modernization Act of 
1999 (allowed banks to enter insurance, real estate and security related activities). 
10 Klaus et al , 1997. 
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Literature Review 
Until recently, most of the literature in this field has concentrated on the 
determinants of financial/bank crisis (i.e., Calomiris, 1990; de la Caudra & Valdes, 1992; 
Kaminksy & Rienhart, 1996; McKinnon & Pill, 1996; Hagen & Ho, 2003; Demirguc-
Kunt & Detragiache, 1998, 2005), where incentives that lead banks to take on more risk 
have taken a back stage. However, our approach to studying the risk taking problems of 
banks is the change in risk incentives directly and it is relatively new. Following Gruben 
et al. (1997, 1998, 2003), we examine the shifts in bank risk and the factors that directly 
make such activities more attractive.  
Gruben et al. (1999) point out that the two major factors that cause banking panic 
are lack of market (depositor) discipline and financial liberalization. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998a, 1998b, 2005) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) find evidence 
indicating that the risk-taking activities of banks increase in the wake of liberalization, 
especially in countries where financial institutions are underdeveloped, law enforcement 
is weak and regulatory supervision is inadequate, which is more likely in developing 
countries. In developing countries, such liberalization often results in increased 
opportunities for excessive risk-taking and fraud.  
 Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a, 1998b, and 2000a) find evidence that 
risk-taking activities on the part of banks also increase due to the moral hazards created 
by deposit insurance. This shows that explicit deposit insurance reduces depositor 
discipline, which increases moral hazard. Thus two factors directly related to the stability 
of banks are market discipline and financial liberalization.  
Apart from the recent increase in the number of bank crises and the resultant 
academic interest, in June 2004,11 the Basel Committee and the 10 OECD countries 
finalized Basel II. It is expected that before long, this will become the internationally 
accepted standard for bank supervision and regulation, like its predecessor Basel I, which 
is at different phases of implementation in over 100 countries12. The primary focus of 
                                                 
11 Website of the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision.  
12 Panel Discussion on Basel II by Jaime Caruana: Basel II at the Bankers Conference 2004, New Delhi, 11 
November, 2004. 
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Basel II is risk measurement and risk management,13 making the changes in banks’ risk-
taking in response to policy changes more important than before. At the same time, the 
Committee has also decided that “market discipline” be made one of the three pillars14 on 
which future financial regulation should be based, because such discipline imposes strong 
incentives on banks to conduct their business in a safe, sound, and efficient manner, and 
also to hold adequate capital with respect to the regulatory minimum. These steps are 
expected to reduce the risk of bank portfolios (Ghosh & Das, 2004), but as it has been 
pointed out, there is little empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. This paper looks 
to fill that gap. 
Despite strong interest of and rapid progress in research into the issues (not to 
mention the urgency of such studies), research with respect to developing and emerging 
market countries remain incomplete, with the exception of some jurisdictions (i.e., 
Argentina (1995), Canada (1984-86), Mexico (1995), Singapore (1997-99), Norway 
(1987-89), and Texas Savings and Loan Associations (1984-90)). Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999) refer to the South American financial problem of 1995 and to the Asian Crisis of 
1997 as the “twin crisis”; the countries involved in these crises face concurrent exchange 
rate and banking problems. The present study expands upon the existing literature for 
South Asian countries, to include South Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia.  
One of the relevant studies for the present study is Gruben and McComb (2003), 
who apply the Breshnahan methodology to the Mexican banking sector of the mid-1990s 
and find that the Mexican banking system was super-competitive – that is, marginal 
prices were set below marginal costs. This was called “super-competition,” where banks 
take risks now to capture a larger share of the market, and in the future hopefully reap the 
benefits of such a hostile expansion of market share.  
The two most relevant studies for the current paper are Gruben et al. (1998) and 
Gruben et al. (2003). The study of Argentina, Mexico and Canada by Gruben et al. 
(1998) finds that lending risk (measured as a level of “super-competition”) increases 
                                                 
13 Inaugural address by Nicholas C. Pan, Superintendent, Office of the Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions, Canada, Chairman of the Basel Accord Implementation Group, February 2005. 
14 According to the June 2004 declarations of the Basel II Accord, the three pillars include (i) risk-weighted 
capital ratios, (ii) supervisory oversight, and (iii) market discipline.  
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significantly in the aftermath of liberalization, in countries where market discipline is 
weak. However, where depositors discipline banks by withdrawing deposits when asset 
quality falls , banks do not behave in a risky fashion. Again, another study by Gruben et 
al. (2003) on six jurisdictions (Argentina, Canada, Mexico, Norway, Singapore, and 
Texas) provides evidence that bank risk increases significantly in the aftermath of 
liberalization, but only where depositors fail to discipline banks and where market 
discipline and bank risk were persistently and inversely related.  
As a result, current paper attempts to find answers to the following three 
important questions: (i) does depositor discipline exist in the selected South East Asian 
countries; (ii) does risky lending occur prior to bank crises, and (iii) what is the 
relationship between depositor discipline and bank risk-taking behavior? We follow a 
joint Breshnan (1982)/Shaffer (1989)/Gruben (1999) framework. We intend to extend the 
study for five South Asian Countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines 
and Thailand, during the Asian Crisis of 1997. We focus directly on the changes to risk-
taking attitude of banks immediately before and after that financial crisis.  
 
Analysis 
 Following Gruben et al (2003) and Gruben et al (2003) we test the existence of 
depositor discipline: do the depositors punish banks by withdrawing deposits when asset 
quality declines. If so, then the growth rate of deposits (RTDEPGROW) should be 
negatively related with asset quality (ASSETQUALITY). We set up the following model: 
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The proxies for ASSETQUALITY included here are (i) Ratio of Loan Loss Reserve to 
Gross Loan (LLRG); (ii) Ratio of Loan Loss Provision to Net Internal Reserve (LLLP); 
(iii) Loan Loss Reserve to Impaired Loan (LLRL); and (iv) Impaired Loan to Gross Loan 
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(ILGL)15. These variables are used one after another in equation (1.1) and so the 
regression is run four times. If depositor discipline exists, then all of these variables 
should be negatively related to the dependent variable. For more on the expected signs 
for this and all subsequent models (i.e., equations (4.9), (4.10) and (4.11)), please see 
Appendix D – Chapter 4. 
 Equation (4.1) includes three control variables: EQTA, or Ratio of equity capital 
to total assets; LTA, or Log of Total Assets; and TDTL, or deposit configuration variable. 
The signs of the coefficients of EQTA and TDTL are empirical. If depositors prefer an 
adequately capitalized bank to an undercapitalized bank – to the extent that they will 
transfer their funds from the undercapitalized to the adequately capitalized bank, then 
EQTA will have a positive relationship with deposit growth. This needs to be tested 
empirically. Similar implications hold for TDTL, but for LTA, the “too big to fail” 
hypothesis implies that larger banks should be able to attract more deposits, as they 
command higher levels of confidence among depositors.   
In the next step, we construct the index of competition using the simultaneous 
equation model that Shaffer (1989, 1993, 1995) introduced. The model tests the market 
power of a commercial banking system by estimating an index of market power (λ) and 
then identifying breaks in competitiveness by applying a dummy variable. To test if the 
degree of competition increases following liberalization, the dummy variable is set to 
change value from zero to one after liberalization.  
The index of market power (λ) captures the difference between a firm’s perceived 
marginal revenue schedule and its demand schedule. Under competitive conditions, 
marginal cost can be set to be equal to perceived marginal revenue. If the firm’s 
perceived marginal revenue schedule and its demand schedule are identical, then setting 
marginal cost equal to perceived marginal revenue is the same as setting marginal cost 
equal to demand price, which is the condition of perfect competition. If firms act in 
collusion, however – such as in a duopoly or extreme monopoly – then they set marginal 
cost equal to a perceived marginal revenue that corresponds to the industry’s marginal 
revenue curve.  
                                                 
15 Depositor discipline can be tested in several ways. One is to examine if banks with lower asset quality 
have to pay higher interest rates on their deposit to attract more fund. We have tested such a model but did 
not find significant and meaningful coefficients to support this. So, we do not elaborate that model.  
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A demand function for commercial bank services is written as follows: 
εα += ),,( YPDQ      (4.2) 
 
Where Q is quantity, P is price, Y is a vector of exogenous variables, α is a vector of 
demand equation parameters to be estimated, and ε is a random error term.  
 Actual (as distinguish from perceived) marginal revenue16 is: 
)//(
),,,(
PQQP
YQhPMR
∂∂+=
+= α
    (4.3) 
The function ),,( αYQh  is the inverse of semi-elasticity of demand,17 and 0(*)≤h . A 
firm’s perceived marginal revenue is: 
),,( αλ YQhPMR P +=     (4.4) 
 
where λ is a new parameter to be estimated, .10 ≤≤λ  Here, λ measures the degree to 
which firms recognize the distinction between demand and marginal revenue functions. 
Let c(Q, W, β) be the average firm’s marginal cost function, where W is a vector of 
exogenous supply side variables and β is a vector of supply-side parameters to be 
estimated. Maximizing firms will set perceived marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, 
or where η is a random error term. 
ηαλβ +−= ),,(),,( YQhWQcP    (4.5) 
  
If firms act as price-takers so that they do not perceive a difference between their 
marginal revenue functions and demand function, then λ = 0. If firms act as a joint 
monopoly (λ = 1), clearly perceiving a difference between their demand and marginal 
revenue functions, they set an output where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. 
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Intermediate values of λ correspond to other oligopoly solution concepts. A Cournot 
equilibrium is suggested when λ = 1/n. 
 To estimate λ, it is necessary to estimate simultaneously specifications of both 
(4.2) and (4.5), treating P and Q as endogenous variables. The demand function is 
specified as: 
εααααααα +++++++= YZPYZPZYPQ 6543210    (4.6) 
 
where Q is output quantity, P is output price, Y is a measure of macro-economic activity 
(assumed to be an exogenous variable), and Z is the price of a substitute for bank output 
(also assumed to be exogenous). The interaction terms – the products PZ, PY and YZ – 
are necessary to permit the rotation of the demand curve, as required to identify λ. 
 Following the model of Shaffer (1993), a translog cost function is used to estimate 
the average commercial bank’s cost function as follows: 
2/2)2ln(62/2)1ln(52ln41ln32)(ln2ln10ln WWWWQQC γγγγγγγ ++++++=  
  (4.7) 
 2lnln91lnln82ln1ln7 WQWQWW γγγ +++ , 
 
where C is total cost, and W1 and W2 are exogenous input prices, as explained below. 
Equation (4.7) gives rise to the following marginal cost function, c(Q,W,β).  
ηββββ ++++= )2ln41ln3ln21)(/( WWQQCMC    (4.8) 
 Therefore, equation (4.5) is specified as follows:  
ξββββαααλ +++++++−= )2ln41ln3ln21)(/()531/( WWQQCYZQP  (4.9) 
 Based on this equation, in the first step, the value of –λ represents a typical bank’s 
percentage deviation of output from competitive levels. This –λ is smaller than zero, 
which implies that output is below competitive levels. If λ is zero, it implies that output is 
at a competitive level; a –λ larger than zero implies that output exceeds that of 
competitive levels. The last of  is these is called super-competition. This means that 
banks are operating at a point where marginal cost is larger than perceived marginal 
benefit.  
 However, equation (4.9) is not configured to facilitate the analysis of breaks in 
bank behavior. To allow for breaks, we rely on the following specification of (4.6): 
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ξαααβββββαααλ +++−++++++−= )531/(5)2ln41ln3ln21)(/()531/( YZDQWWQQCYZQP  (4.10), 
 
where D is a dummy variable (which is more fully explained below), and ξ  is a random 
error term. The system of equation represented by (4.6) and (4.10) is then estimated 
simultaneously with 3SLS.  
At this stage, we deal with the difference of competition between the two periods, 
and we use the value of dummy variable 5β . Before, the liberalization date index of 
market power will be λ; afterwards, it will be λ+ 5β . Thus, 5β shows the difference 
between the levels of competition between the two periods. If we find that the value of 
5β is negative and large, that will imply that banks significantly increased its risk-taking 
behavior after liberalization or privatization. For more on the expected signs of these 
equations (i.e., equations (4.9) and (4.10)), please see Appendix D – Chapter 4. 
Gruben et al. (2003) examine the relationship between depositor discipline and 
the structural break in the direction of super-competitiveness with the help of graphical 
representation. In the first representation, t-statistics associated with the past-due-loans-
to-total-assets18 (indicator of depositor discipline) ratio were plotted on the horizontal 
axis against the index of competition (coefficient 5β  in equation (4.10)) on the vertical 
axis. In the next graph, t-statistics associated with the past-due-loans-to-total-assets 
ratio19 are plotted on the horizontal axis against the t-statistics of the same index of 
competition (coefficient 5β  in equation (4.10)).   
The Panzer and Rosse (1982, 1987) or PR approach is used to assess the 
competitive nature of banking industries, starting from 1998. The PR H-statistics, which 
will be our index of competition, is calculated from reduced-form bank revenue 
equations. This index measures the sum of the elasticities of the total revenue of the 
banks with respect to the bank’s input prices. The PR H-statistic is adopted from 
Claessens et al. (2003) and its values and interpretations are presented in Table A 
below20.  
                                                 
18 This t-statistic was multiplied by -1.  
19 This t-statistic was multiplied by -1.  
20 These values and interpretation assume that the tests are undertaken on observations that are in long-run 
equilibrium.  
 45
 
Table A: PR H-statistics 
Value of PR H-statistics Decision 
H<0 Monopoly 
H=1 Perfect Competition 
0<H<1 Monopolistic Competition 
 
Again in line with Claessens et al. (2003), the following reduced-form revenue 
equation is estimated on pooled samples for each country to derive the H-statistics  
itititit
itititit
YYY
WWWP
εγγγ
βββα
+++
++++=
)ln()ln()ln(
)ln()ln()ln()ln(
,33,22,11
,33,22,11   (4.11) 
Here, itP  is the ratio of gross interest revenue to total assets (proxy for output 
price of loans), itW ,1  is the ratio of interest expense to total deposits and money market 
funding (proxy for input price of deposits), itW ,2  is the ratio of personnel expense to total 
assets (proxy for input price of labor), and itW ,3 is the ratio of other operating and 
administrative expense to total assets (proxy for input price of equipment/fixed capital). 
The subscript “i” and “t” denote banks and years, respectively.  
Three control variables are also included in the model itY ,1 , which is the ratio of 
equity to total assets. itY ,2  is the ratio of net loans to total assets, and itY ,3  is the logarithm 
of total assets (to control for potential size effect). The natural logarithm of all variables 
is taken.  
The model is estimated using different techniques: (i) bank specific intercept with 
fixed effect; (ii) random effect; (iii) between effect; and (iv) OLS on pooled data. Also 
we run the regressions across countries and across years.  
All data for bank specific variables come from Bank Scope CD, 2005. All macro-
economic variables come from World Development Indicators Online, 2005.  
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Empirical Results 
We present the summary statistics in Table 4.1 of the Data Appendix. Panel a 
presents summary statistics for the variables used in the Shaffer (1993) model. The 
sample period is 1992-2004. We test for breaks in competitive behavior after the 1996-
2004 periods.  
On the other hand, panel b of Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for depositor 
discipline regressions for the period 1996-2004. Table 4.2 presents similar panels for 
correlation between variables.  
Table 4.3 presents the OLS regression results for equation (4.1). The equation 
tests for the existence of depositor discipline in the selected five South Asian countries  
(Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand), to see if the depositors 
withdraw their deposits when the asset quality of banks declines. With each dependent 
variable, we alternatively tested with three different dependent variables: (i) deposit 
growth rate, (ii) total deposit, and (iii) total deposit divided by total assets. Only the 
results for the last one were reported, because it had the best outcome. On the other hand, 
we also tested with four alternative definitions of asset quality, namely: (i) ratio of loan 
loss reserve to gross loan (LLRG), presented in panel a; (ii) ratio of loan loss provision to 
net internal reserve (LLLP), in panel b; (iii) ratio of impaired loan to gross loan (ILGL), in 
panel c; and (iv) ratio of loan loss reserve to impaired loan (LLRL), in panel d. In total, 
four sets of regressions were run through equation (4.1) for each of the five countries.  
Overall, we find that the state of depositor discipline was very weak. Most of the 
asset quality proxies have insignificant coefficients, and even when they were significant, 
the coefficients were very low or close to zero, indicating the impact was very small. As a 
result, we conclude that total deposits scaled by total assets are probably not related to 
changes in asset quality. Given the role of government guarantees, this is hardly 
surprising. This can be supported by the recent findings of Mondschean et al (1998) in 
the case of Poland. These authors find that use of explicit deposit guarantees starting in 
late 1994 has removed the use of market discipline as a check on these banks behavior. 
Before the deposit guarantee program, depositors extracted a price of risk, but after the 
program was initiated that stopped. Imai (2005) found that when the Japanese 
government lifted a blanket guarantee on April 1, 2002, the sensitivity of interest rates on 
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deposits increased, implying enhanced depositor discipline. Ioannidou et al (2006) 
pointed found similar evidence in case of Bolivia between 1998 to 2003. Martinez et al 
(1999) studied depositor discipline in Argentina, Mexico and Chile during the 1980s and 1990s. 
They examined if the depositors punish risky banks by withdrawing their deposits and found 
support for this. So, their evidence supports the argument that depositor discipline exists.  
In Tables 4.4, results for the Shaffer (1993) model (equations (4.6) and (4.10)) are 
presented based on 3SLS estimation method, with a cross-equation restriction for the 
parameters of the demand equation (4.6). The 3SLS method estimates the equations 
simultaneously.  
None of the λ coefficients in the five countries are significant. This implies that 
the coefficient is statistically equal to zero, indicating perfect competition. Similarly, the 
beta five coefficients are all insignificant, indicating there was no change in the 
competitive behavior of banks before and after 1996.  
In Table 4.5, we combine the index of competition (panel a – beta five coefficient 
3SLS) from Table 4.4 with the index of depositor discipline (panel b – coefficient of 
proxy for asset quality) in Table 4.3, in order to test the link between the two. We do not 
find evidence aligned with that of Gruben et al. (2003), that these are inversely related.  
Table 4.6 shows the results for the PR-methodology (H-statistics) across countries 
and across years. The value of the H-statistics (between zero and one) shows evidence of 
collusion among banks in the different countries.  
Table 4.7 shows the value of H-statistics for each country between 1996 and 
2004, using different estimation techniques. The parameters estimated with OLS are the 
smallest, whereas those estimated with fixed effects are the highest. Random-effect 
results are found in the middle, but all those values are less than one – again suggesting 
collusive behavior in the banking sectors of these five countries.  
 
Conclusions 
The present study provides evidence on the behavior of banks with respect to risk 
taking and strength of depositor discipline within the context of South East Asian Crises 
of 1997. The results are in line with that of Gurben (1998, 2003) and other studies. Even 
in the after-math of Asian Crises, the strength of depositor discipline (tested as a negative 
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relationship between depositor discipline and assets quality) was absent. Depositors as a 
group did not withdraw deposits from banks in reaction to a decline in their asset quality. 
This also highlights the importance of the need to improve measures that strengthen 
depositor discipline, such as, the measures put forward in Basel II. Timely and accurate 
dissemination of information can go a long way to solve these problems. Overall, any 
measure that enhances transparency and accountability of the decision making of banks is 
welcome. These are some of the objectives of Basel II.  
For the test of a break in the competitive behavior of banks before and after 1996, 
we find no change in banks’ risk-taking behavior before and after the crisis. Also the 
index has a value of zero, implying competitive behavior of banks in these countries. This 
to is in line with Gruben et al. (1998, 2003). However, use of PR-methodology to 
measure bank competitive behavior indicates the monopolistic competition and not 
perfect competition exists in these markets.  
However, we did not find a consistent link between depositor discipline and bank 
risk taking, which can be explained by the weak state of depositor discipline. At least 
until today depositor discipline has not grown strong enough to affect banks risk-taking 
behavior. More needs to be done to make depositor discipline effective. Caprio et al 
(2004) also arrived at the same conclusion. They pointed out that “it seems that greater 
emphasis on the third pillar in the Basel II Accord that on the refinements of the risk-
weighting system of the first pillar may be warranted for most developing countries.  
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Chapter 5. Overall Conclusion 
 
We present the overall conclusion of the three essays in the present dissertation in 
the following couple of paragraphs. Chapter 2 and 3, provide combined evidence that the 
capital regulations similar to Basel accord had several important impacts on the risk 
taking and lending activities of commercial banks in the developed and developing 
countries around the world. In contrast to previous studies that deal with one developed 
countries with a few exceptions, evidence of these chapters come from multi-country 
panel data.  
It is often  pointed out that the two most important impacts of Basel accord are: 
one; undercapitalized banks did increase their actual capital ratios in response to 
regulatory minimum capital ratio; and two; there is limited evidence that such regulations 
were associated with a decline in bank lending activities due to pressure on banks to hold 
more capital.  
Chapter 2 provides evidence that the increase in actual capital ratio of under-
capitalized banks did not come at the cost of higher risk. Indeed, evidence reveals that the 
relationship between these two variables is negative.  
In the second step, we examine the relationship between capital ratios and risk 
under different conditions. Evidence for the proxy of financial development remains 
ambiguous. There is evidence that banks operating in more restrictive environment, 
abstain from taking higher risk.  
Chapter 3 also provides long-run evidence that the average capital ratios and 
equity of banks increased in the aftermath of implementation of capital regulations. It 
also provides evidence that such regulations have strong impact on the important decision 
making variable of banks, for example, measures of banks capital and bank loans. 
Chapter 4 provides evidence that the state of depositor discipline is weak in five 
selected countries of South East Asia, which include Malaysia, South Korea, Philippines, 
Thailand and Indonesia. Depositors did not punish commercial banks in response to a 
decline in the quality of assets. Banking industry in these countries remained perfectly 
competitive during this time period and there was no shift of bank competition.  But we 
could not establish the link between depositor discipline and bank capital.  
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Chatper 2 . Empirical Appendix 
 
Table 2.1-a: Summary Statistics  
 All Banks  Undercapitalized Banks  
 Developing 
Countries  
Developed 
Countries  All Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries All Countries 
Total Capital 
828195.912    
1085865.477   
[330] 
2819642.794   
7970942.997   
[1336] 
2447330.370   
7286497.394   
[1622] 
188813.902 
491796.388 
[51] 
625301.818 
1012443.761 
[223] 
579342.349 
970156.729 
[258] 
Tier-1 
Capital 
576397.176    
716118.665 
[330] 
1709857.540   
4421719.465   
[1336] 
1496010.019   
4045554.335   
[1622] 
109408.590 
296539.631 
[50] 
507127.741 
909434.602 
[223] 
461079.175 
861720.270 
[258] 
Tier-1 
Capital 
Ratio 
11.583 
10.027    
[330] 
11.379 
13.265 
[1336] 
11.407 
12.833 
[1622] 
-1.038 
10.488 
[20] 
2.675 
28.819 
[209] 
1.421 
27.856 
[228] 
Total Capital 
Ratio 
14.426 
9.962     
[330] 
13.422    
13.053    
[1336] 
13.564 
12.642 
[1622] 
2.241 
7.998 
[56] 
5.821 
2.396 
[229] 
5.355 
4.019 
[268] 
Total Assets 
1.12446D+07   
1.53137D+07   
[330] 
4.06122D+07   
1.10136D+08   
[1336] 
3.49981D+07   
1.00716D+08   
[1622] 
143531.926 
354911.681 
[54] 
498603.294 
788298.073 
[204] 
454002.438 
747306.372 
[242] 
Loan Loss 
Reserve 
Divided 
Gross Loan 
5.82022       
4.61194       
[330] 
2.530 
4.448 
[1336] 
3.161 
4.690 
[1622] 
6988798.643 
1.02450D+07 
[56] 
1.81576D+07 
3.24475D+07 
[203] 
1.67233D+07 
3.02344D+07 
[242] 
Return on 
Assets 
-.029 
2.930    
 [330] 
1.029 
9.586 
[1336] 
.815 
8.809 
[1622] 
5.439 
7.186 
[56] 
3.601 
2.293 
[193] 
4.104 
3.886 
[232] 
Liquid 
Assets 
2212584.173   
2640161.047   
[330] 
7145146.945   
2.01144D+07   
[1336] 
6053621.568   
1.82572D+07   
[1622] 
-1.858 
4.052 
[56] 
1372.701 
19466.861 
[201] 
1149.27 
117815.123 
[240] 
Government 
Security and 
Bond 
Holding 
506208.827    
1041874.784   
[330] 
1244145.526   
4414793.708   
[1336] 
1073584.311   
4021236.328   
[1622] 
1590150.3931 
970397.446 
[56] 
4473199.547 
1.46353D+07 
[203] 
4063338.810 
1.34596D+07 
[242] 
Domestic 
Credit to 
Private 
Sector (% of 
GDP) 
121.389 
39.007    
[330] 
157.815 
34.417 
[1311] 
151.963 
35.977 
[1622] 
327409.875 
519752.035 
[56] 
705727.961 
2313089.753 
[229] 
635704.153 
2148083.047 
[268] 
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Table 2.1-a: ( Continued) 
 All Banks  Undercapitalized Banks  
 Developing 
Countries  
Developed 
Countries  All Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries All Countries 
Foreign 
Direct 
Investment, 
Net Inflows 
(% of GDP) 
1.74565D+11   
1.61818D+11   
[330] 
6.56499D+12   
2.31918D+12   
[1311] 
5.34068D+12   
3.26717D+12   
[1622] 
61.7504 
4.876 
[56] 
165.554 
57.588 
[229] 
152.423 
64.584 
[268] 
GDP 
(Constant 
2000 USD) 
3.752 
6.785 
[330] 
2.337 
1.041    
[1311] 
2.451 
1.280 
[1622] 
44.896 
49.379 
[56] 
124.031 
39.075 
[229] 
114.704 
46.919 
[268] 
Inflation, 
Consumer 
Prices 
(Annual %) 
984.317 
9464.450 
[330] 
84.025 
281.887    
[1311] 
123.092 
341.355 
[1622] 
2.13002D+11 
2.24761D+11   
[56] 
3.95940D+12 
1.62911D+12   
[229] 
3.42375D+12 
1.99125D+12   
[268] 
Official 
Exchange 
Rate (LCU 
per USD; 
Period 
Average) 
3.186 
1.922 
[330] 
.741 
.470 
[1311] 
1.214 
1.333 
[1622] 
24.056 
23.296      
[56] 
.9661 
.196 
[229] 
3.052 
8.183      
[268] 
 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis reflect the total number of observation.  
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Table 2.1-b: Summary Statistics  
Observation  Country Banks  
Percentage 
of Total  
1 BELGIUM 77 2 
2 BRAZIL 302 9 
3 CANADA 62 2 
4 CHILE 58 2 
5 FRANCE 419 13 
6 GERMANY 311 11 
7 INDIA 28 1 
8 ITALY 193 6 
9 JAPAN 361 11 
10 KOREA REP. OF 71 2 
11 MALAYSIA 76 2 
12 NETHERLANDS 73 2 
13 NORWAY 29 1 
14 SWEDEN 20 1 
15 SWITZERLAND 284 9 
16 THAILAND 32 1 
17 UNITED KINGDOM 250 8 
18 USA 571 17 
19 VENEZUELA 59 2 
   2731 100 
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Table 2.2-a: All Countries: Simple Model (Capital Equation (2.7) and Risk Equations (2.8)) 
 Total Capital Tier-1 Capital 
 Capital Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
 Van Roy’s Dummy 
Variable 
Simple Dummy 
Variable 
Van Roy’s Dummy 
Variable Simple Dummy Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Constant 
-12.67      
-5.39     
(.00***) 
-.09 
-3.25     
(.00***) 
-12.54      
-5.25     
(.00***) 
-.10 
-3.28     
(.00***) 
-12.48     
    -4.72     
(.00***) 
-.04 
-.53     
(.59) 
-11.26      
-4.11     
(.00***) 
-.07 
-1.05     
(.29) 
Change in 
Risk/ 
Change in 
Capital 
-25.40      
-14.63     
(.00***) 
.00 
-16.34     
(.00***) 
-26.35      
-15.02     
(.00***) 
00 
-16.59     
(.00***). 
-5.46     
    -7.15     
(.00***) 
-.01 
-7.57     
(.00***) 
-11.10      
-8.05     
(.00***) 
-.01 
-12.94     
(.00***) 
Regulatory 
Dummy 
Variable 
.96         
7.38     
(.00***) 
.00         
1.13     
(.26) 
2.75        
3.86     
(.00***) 
.01         
1.38     
(.17) 
.88     
    6.54     
(.00***) 
.00         
.48     
(.63) 
2.76        
2.38     
(.02**) 
-.04 
-1.43     
(.15) 
Lag of Capital 
Ratio/Risk  
.28         
18.17     
(.00***) 
.22         
14.84     
(.00***) 
.28         
17.85     
(.00***) 
.22         
14.86     
(.00***) 
.31     
    20.06    
(.00***) 
.15         
12.63     
(.00***) 
.29         
18.33     
(.00***) 
.30         
22.13     
(.00***) 
Log of Total 
Assets 
.46         
4.15     
(.00***) 
.00 
-1.06     
(.29) 
.44         
3.92     
(.00***) 
.00 
-1.12     
(.26) 
.60       
   4.88     
(.00***) 
.00 
-.54     
(.59) 
.55         
4.33     
(.00***) 
.00 
-1.30     
(.19) 
Log of Ratio of 
Liquid Assets 
to Total Assets 
-.84 
-3.56     
(.00***) 
.01         
3.25     
(.00***) 
-.84 
-3.53     
(.00***) 
.01         
3.28     
(.00***) 
-.90 
-3.69     
(.00***) 
.01         
1.44     
(.15) 
-.84 
-3.30     
(.00***) 
.01         
1.76     
(.08*) 
ROA 
-.04 
-1.83     
(.07*) 
.00         
1.11     
(.27) 
-.04 
-1.98     
(.05**) 
.00        
1.07     
(.29) 
-.04 
-1.86     
(.06*) 
.00         
1.27     
(.21) 
-.04 
-1.83     
(.07*) 
.00         
2.28     
(.02**) 
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Table 2.2-a: Continued 
 Total Capital Tier-1 Capital 
 Capital Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
 Van Roy’s Dummy 
Variable 
Simple Dummy 
Variable 
Van Roy’s Dummy 
Variable 
Simple Dummy 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Log of Ratio of 
Government 
Assets to Total 
Assets 
8.04        
1.87     
(.06*) 
.29         
5.30     
(.00***) 
7.50        
1.72     
(.09*) 
.29         
5.26     
(.00***) 
2.75        
.57     
(.57) 
.20         
1.37     
(.17) 
4.01        
.80     
(.42) 
.10      
   .74   
   (.46) 
Domestic 
Credit to 
Private Sector 
(% of GDP) 
.00 
-.31     
(.75) 
.00 
-2.85     
(.00***) 
.00 
-.19     
(.85) 
.00 
-2.77     
(.01***) 
-.01 
-1.46     
(.14) 
.00 
-.44     
(.66) 
-.02 
-1.81     
(.07*) 
.00 
-.60     
(.55) 
Foreign Direct 
Investment, 
Net Inflows (% 
of GDP) 
.00 
-.19     
(.85) 
.00 
-.71     
(.48) 
.00 
-.26     
(.79) 
.00 
-.83     
(.41) 
.02         
.08     
(.93) 
-.01 
-.72     
(.47) 
.20         
.82     
(.41) 
-.01 
-1.71 
(.09*) 
GDP (Constant 
2000 USD) 
.00         
.77     
(.44) 
.00         
5.98     
(.00***) 
.00         
.63     
(.53) 
.00         
5.96     
(.00***) 
.00 
-.31     
(.75) 
.00         
1.27     
(.21) 
.00         
.51     
(.61) 
.00         
.58     
(.56) 
Inflation, 
Consumer 
Prices (Annual 
%) 
-.01 
-.04     
(.97) 
.00 
-.60     
(.55) 
.01         
.08     
(.94) 
.00 
-.50     
(.62) 
.13         
.62     
(.54) 
.00 
-.50     
(.62) 
.03         
.14     
(.89) 
.00 
-.78     
(.43) 
Official 
Exchange Rate 
(LCU per 
USD; Period 
Average) 
.00         
.38     
(.71) 
.00         
2.49     
(.01**) 
.00         
.79     
(.43) 
.00         
2.55     
(.01**) 
.00 
-1.09     
(.28) 
.00 
-.78     
(.44) 
.00 
-.58     
(.56) 
.00 
-.00    
(.48) 
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Table 2.2-b: Developed Countries: Simple Model (Capital Equation (2.7) and Risk Equations (2.8)) 
 
 Total Capital Tier-1 Capital 
 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equatio
n 
 
Van Roy’s Dummy 
Variable 
Simple Dummy 
Variable 
Van Roy’s Dummy 
Variable 
Simple Dummy 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Constant 
-10.75      
-3.36     
(.00***) 
-.04 
-1.54     
(.12) 
-11.71      
-3.62     
(.00***) 
.00 
-1.68     
(.09*) 
-11.78      
-3.54     
(.00***) 
-.03 
-.65     
(.51) 
-11.70      
-3.51     
(.00***) 
-.03 
-.55     
(.59) 
Change in Risk 
-46.38      
-17.12     
(.00***) 
.00 
-19.52     
(.00***) 
-46.80      
-17.27     
(.00***) 
-.06 
-2.05     
(.04**) 
-14.76      
-8.46     
(.00***) 
.00 
-9.58     
(.00***) 
-14.79      
-8.46     
(.00***) 
.00 
-9.61     
(.00***) 
Regulatory Dummy 
Variable 
.88      
2.48     
(.01**) 
.00 
.84     
(.40) 
2.87      
3.16     
(.00***) 
.00 
-19.53     
(.00***) 
.45      
1.08     
(.28) 
-.01 
-2.07     
(.04**) 
1.03      
.67     
(.50) 
-.07 
-2.94     
(.00***) 
Lag of Capital 
Ratio/Risk  
.25      
14.14     
(.00***) 
.15      
10.77     
(.00***) 
.25      
14.18     
(.00***) 
.02     
  3.03     
(.00***) 
.30      
16.74     
(.00***) 
.14      
5.77     
(.00***) 
.30      
16.72     
(.00***) 
.14      
5.76     
(.00***) 
Log of Total Assets 
.44      
3.01     
(.00***) 
.00 
-1.98     
(.05**) 
.49      
3.29     
(.00***) 
.15      
 10.81     
(.00***) 
.61      
3.99     
(.00***) 
.00 
-.06     
(.95) 
.61      
3.98     
(.00***) 
.00 
-.12     
(.90) 
Log of Ratio of 
Liquid Assets to 
Total Assets 
-.72 
-2.65     
(.01***) 
.01      
2.76     
(.01***) 
-.72 
-2.65     
(.01***) 
.00 
-1.49     
(.14) 
-.94 
-3.35     
(.00***) 
.01      
1.71     
(.09*) 
-.94 
-3.36     
(.00***) 
.01      
1.69     
(.09*) 
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Table 2.2-b: Continued  
 
 Total Capital Tier-1 Capital 
 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equatio
n 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
 
Van Roy’s Dummy 
Variable 
Simple Dummy 
Variable 
Van Roy’s Dummy 
Variable 
Simple Dummy 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
ROA 
-.03 
-1.24     
(.22) 
.00      
2.51     
(.01**) 
-.03 
-1.24     
(.22) 
.01      
2.83     
(.00***) 
-.04 
-1.63     
(.10) 
.00      
1.53     
(.13) 
-.04 
-1.64     
(.10) 
.00      
1.59     
(.11) 
Log of Ratio of 
Government Assets 
to Total Assets 
15.95      
1.62     
(.10) 
.24      
2.71     
(.01***) 
13.57      
1.37     
(.17) 
.00      
2.43     
(.02**) 
10.14      
.97     
(.33) 
.00 
-.01     
(.99) 
10.23      
.98     
(.33) 
-.01 
-.04     
(.97) 
Domestic Credit to 
Private Sector (% 
of GDP) 
-.01 
-.60     
(.55) 
.00      
1.46     
(.14) 
-.01 
-.89     
(.37) 
.22      
2.40     
(.02**) 
-.02 
-1.53     
(.13) 
.00 
-1.87     
(.06*) 
-.02 
-1.55     
(.12) 
.00 
-1.85     
(.06*) 
Foreign Direct 
Investment, Net 
Inflows (% of 
GDP) 
-1.80 
-2.20     
(.03**) 
-.02 
-2.91     
(.00***) 
-1.54 
-1.86     
(.06*) 
.00      
1.09     
(.28) 
-1.51 
-1.71     
(.09*) 
-.02 
-1.38     
(.17) 
-1.52 
-1.73     
(.08*) 
-.02 
-1.46     
(.15) 
GDP (Constant 
2000 USD) 
.00 
-.18     
(.86) 
.00 
-1.77     
(.08*) 
.00 
.18     
(.85) 
-.02 
-2.37     
(.02**) 
.00 
-.02     
(.98) 
.00      
1.31     
(.19) 
.00 
-.03     
(.98) 
.00      
1.27     
(.20) 
Inflation, 
Consumer Prices 
(annual %) 
.99      
2.10     
(.04**) 
.01      
2.35     
(.02**) 
.99      
2.09     
(.04**) 
.00 
-1.23     
(.22) 
.67      
1.32     
(.19) 
.00 
.51     
(.61) 
.68      
1.32     
(.19) 
.00 
.42     
(.68) 
Official Exchange 
Rate (LCU per 
USD; Period 
Average) 
.00 
-1.72     
(.09*) 
.00 
-1.40     
(.16) 
.00 
-1.68     
(.09*) 
.01      
2.40     
(.02**) 
.00 
-1.87     
(.06*) 
.00 
-3.04     
(.00***) 
.00 
-1.87     
(.06*) 
.00 
-3.03     
(.00***) 
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Table 2.2-c: Developing Countries: Simple Model (Capital Equation (2.7) and Risk Equations (2.8)) 
 
 Total Capital Tier-1 Capital 
 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
 
Van Roy’s Dummy 
Variable 
Simple Dummy 
Variable 
Van Roy’s Dummy 
Variable 
Simple Dummy 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Constant 
-14.38      
-4.65     
(.00***) 
-1.03      
-4.30     
(.00***) 
-14.99      
-4.33     
(.00***) 
-1.07       
-4.42     
(.00***) 
-3.67       
-1.26     
(.21) 
.36         
.87     
(.39) 
-2.45       
-.68     
(.49) 
.30         
.74     
(.46) 
Change in Risk 
-2.87       
-5.14     
(.00***) 
-.01 
-3.99     
(.00***) 
-2.26       
-3.63     
(.00***) 
-.01 
-2.36     
(.02**) 
-2.87       
-7.84     
(.00***) 
-.04 
-6.52     
(.00***) 
-3.07       
-6.81     
(.00***) 
-.03 
-5.96     
(.00***) 
Regulatory Dummy 
Variable 
1.11        
12.52     
(.00***) 
.03        
3.51     
(.00***) 
8.33        
6.89     
(.00***) 
.00         
.01     
(.99) 
.90         
14.33     
(.00***) 
.03         
3.17     
(.00***) 
5.08        
4.84     
(.00***) 
.05         
.42     
(.67) 
Lag of Capital Ratio / 
Risk  
.35         
14.35     
(.00***) 
.93         
10.84     
(.00***) 
.36         
13.26     
(.00***) 
.94         
10.88     
(.00***) 
.25         
13.38     
(.00***) 
.14         
5.94     
(.00***) 
.27         
11.70     
(.00***) 
.14         
6.01     
(.00***) 
Log of Total Assets 
.66         
3.43     
(.00***) 
.03         
1.79     
(.07*) 
.64         
2.95     
(.00***) 
.03         
1.87     
(.06*) 
.01         
.06     
(.95) 
-.02 
-.72     
(.47) 
-.06 
-.28     
(.78) 
-.01 
-.56     
(.58) 
Log of Ratio of 
Liquid Assets to 
Total Assets 
-.38 
-.70     
(.49) 
.11        
2.69     
(.01***) 
-.70 
-1.13     
(.26) 
.11         
2.60     
(.01***) 
-.12 
-.23     
(.82) 
.22         
3.39     
(.00***) 
.15         
.24     
(.81) 
.22         
3.34     
(.00***) 
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Table 2.2-c: Continued  
 
 Total Capital Tier-1 Capital 
 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
 
Van Roy’s Dummy 
Variable 
Simple Dummy 
Variable 
Van Roy’s Dummy 
Variable 
Simple Dummy 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
ROA 
-.47 
-5.99     
(.00***) 
.00 
-.69     
(.49) 
-.48 
-5.32     
(.00***) 
.00 
-.77     
(.44) 
-.07 
-1.09     
(.28) 
.00         
.30     
(.76) 
-.18 
-2.06     
(.04**) 
.00         
.28     
(.78) 
Log of Ratio of 
Government Assets to 
Total Assets 
1.98        
.60     
(.55) 
.65         
2.59     
(.01***) 
2.57        
.70     
(.48) 
.64         
2.52     
(.01**) 
-1.56       
-.58     
(.56) 
-.18 
-.50     
(.62) 
-1.97       
-.59     
(.55) 
-.20 
-.54     
(.59) 
Domestic Credit to 
Private Sector (% of 
GDP) 
.00 
-.62     
(.54) 
.00        
.21     
(.83) 
.00 
-.31     
(.75) 
.00         
.14     
(.89) 
.00 
-.03     
(.97) 
.00         
.85     
(.39) 
.00 
-.57     
(.57) 
.00         
.66     
(.51) 
Foreign Direct 
Investment, Net 
Inflows (% of GDP) 
.00         
.06     
(.96) 
.00         
4.15     
(.00***) 
.00 
-.94     
(.35) 
.00         
4.37     
(.00***) 
.13         
1.15     
(.25) 
.00 
-.02     
(.98) 
.19         
1.39     
(.17) 
.00         
.03     
(.97) 
GDP (Constant 2000 
USD) 
.00 
-2.42     
(.02**) 
.00         
2.73     
(.01***) 
.00 
-1.90     
(.06*) 
.00        
3.06     
(.00***) 
.00         
.84     
(.40) 
.00         
1.55     
(.12) 
.00         
1.64     
(.10) 
.00         
1.71     
(.09*) 
Inflation, Consumer 
Prices (Annual %) 
-.02 
-.52     
(.61) 
.00 
-.16     
(.87) 
-.03 
-.68     
(.50) 
.00 
-.06     
(.95) 
.03        
.52     
(.60) 
.00         
.59     
(.55) 
-.01 
-.07     
(.94) 
.00         
.53     
(.60) 
Official Exchange 
Rate (LCU per USD, 
Period Average) 
.00         
.85     
(.40) 
.00 
-1.14     
(.25) 
.00         
.49     
(.62) 
.00 
-1.18     
(.24) 
.00 
-.63     
(.53) 
.00 
-.67     
(.50) 
.00 
-.08     
(.93) 
.00 
-.60     
(.55) 
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Table 2.3: All Countries: Year-Regulatory Dummy Interaction  
 Total Capital Tier-1 Capital 
 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equatio
n 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
 
Van Roy’s Dummy 
Variable 
Simple Dummy 
Variable 
Van Roy’s Dummy 
Variable Simple Dummy Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Constant 
-12.324       
-5.210    
(.000***) 
-.087     
-3.046    
(.002**
*) 
-10.882     
-4.048    
(.000***) 
-.036       
-1.358    
(.175) 
-11.072     
-4.175    
(.000***) 
-.023       
-.284    
(.776) 
-6.135      
-1.946    
(.052*) 
.039        
.481    
 (.631) 
Change in Risk 
-27.644       
-15.564    
(.000***) 
-.005     
-17.537   
(.000**
*) 
-37.313    
-17.185    
(.000***) 
-.004       
-18.862    
(.000***) 
-6.131      
-7.916    
(.000***) 
-.006       
-8.020    
(.000***) 
-37.299     
-15.312    
(.000***) 
-.015       
 -25.307    
(.000***) 
Regulatory Dummy 
-.140       
 -.144    
(.885) 
-.017    
-1.426    
(.154) 
-5.200      
-1.841    
(.066*) 
-.107       
-3.751    
(.000***) 
.186        
.178    
(.859) 
-.002       
-.072    
(.942) 
-4.392      
-1.043    
(.297) 
-.120        
-1.079    
(.281) 
Lag of Capital Ratio 
.269        
17.725    
(.000***) 
.204      
14.406    
(.000**
*) 
.262        
16.759    
(.000***) 
.183        
13.955    
(.000***) 
.307        
19.831    
(.000***) 
.141        
3.346    
(.001***) 
.195        
12.163    
(.000***) 
.006        
.183     
(.855) 
Log of Total Assets 
.458        
4.115    
(.000***) 
-.001     
-.860    
(.390) 
.544        
4.386    
(.000***) 
-.003       
-2.561    
(.010*) 
.472        
3.870    
(.000***) 
-.002       
-.507    
(.612) 
.355        
2.437    
(.015*) 
-.001       
 -.261    
(.794) 
Log of Ratio of 
Liquid Assets to 
Total Assets 
-.832       
  -3.538    
(.000***) 
.009      
2.888    
(.004**
*) 
-.691       
-2.823    
(.005***) 
.010        
3.958    
(.000***) 
-.885       
-3.605    
(.000***) 
.008        
1.002    
(.316) 
-.533       
-1.818    
(.069*) 
-.002       
 -.221    
(.825) 
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Table 2.3: Continued  
 
 Total Capital Tier-1 Capital 
 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
 
Van Roy’s Dummy 
Variable 
Simple Dummy 
Variable 
Van Roy’s Dummy 
Variable Simple Dummy Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
ROA 
-.039       
-1.779    
(.075*) 
.001        
1.503    
(.133) 
-.040       
-1.767    
(.077*) 
.001        
2.714    
(.007***) 
-.041       
-1.791    
(.073*) 
.002        
1.145    
(.252) 
-.026       
-1.184    
(.236) 
.002        
1.438    
(.150) 
Log of Ratio of 
Government Assets to 
Total Assets 
8.651       
2.007    
(.045*) 
.290        
5.449    
(.000***) 
5.873       
1.227    
(.220) 
.192        
3.935    
(.000***) 
3.615       
.749    
(.454) 
.333        
2.176    
(.030*) 
10.947      
1.890    
(.059*) 
.313        
2.035    
(.042*) 
Domestic Credit to 
Private Sector (% of 
GDP) 
-.003       
-.351    
(.726) 
.000        
-3.022    
(.003***) 
-.021       
-2.038    
(.042*) 
.000 
-1.995    
(.046*) 
-.015       
-1.488    
(.137) 
-.001       
-2.121    
(.034*) 
-.033       
-2.705    
(.007***) 
-.001       
 -2.124    
(.034*) 
Foreign Direct 
Investment, Net 
Inflows (% of GDP) 
.000        
.227    
(.821) 
.000        
.374    
(.708) 
.236        
1.057    
(.291) 
-.002       
-.808    
(.419) 
-.020       
-.088    
(.930) 
.017        
2.314    
(.021*) 
.736        
2.642    
(.008***) 
.019        
2.590    
(.010***) 
GDP (Constant 2000 
USD) 
.000        
.778    
(.437) 
.000        
5.915    
(.000***) 
.000        
1.762    
(.078*) 
.000        
4.976    
(.000***) 
.000        
-.077    
(.939) 
.000        
3.472    
(.001***) 
.000        
2.705    
(.007***) 
.000        
3.069    
(.002***) 
Inflation, Consumer 
Prices (Annual %) 
-.029       
-.235    
(.814) 
-.002       
-1.072    
(.284) 
-.013       
-.061    
(.951) 
-.009       
-4.031    
(.000***) 
.103        
.495    
(.621) 
-.010       
-1.451    
(.147) 
-.264       
-1.032    
(.302) 
-.008       
  -1.240    
(.215) 
Official Exchange 
Rate (LCU per USD, 
Period Average) 
.000        
.363    
(.717) 
.000        
2.330    
(.020*) 
.000        
.063    
(.950) 
.000        
3.451    
(.001***) 
-.001       
-1.081    
(.280) 
.000        
.388    
(.698) 
.000        
-.411    
(.681) 
.000        
-.061    
(.952) 
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Table 2.3: Continued   
 Total Capital Tier-1 Capital 
 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
 
Van Roy’s Dummy 
Variable 
Simple Dummy 
Variable 
Van Roy’s Dummy 
Variable Simple Dummy Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Regulatory Dummy 
and  
Year 1 Interaction 
1.095       
1.042    
(.297) 
.011        
.836     
(.403) 
8.934       
2.291    
(.022*) 
.089        
2.251    
(.024*) 
.576        
.518    
 (.604) 
-.002      
  -.057    
(.955) 
9.267       
1.788    
(.074*) 
.173        
1.256    
 (.209) 
Regulatory Dummy 
and  
Year 2 Interaction 
-1.288     
-1.113    
(.266) 
-.046    
  -3.228    
(.001***) 
3.304       
.951    
 (.342) 
.034        
.969    
 (.333) 
-.461      
 -.352     
(.725) 
-.080      
 -1.937    
(.053*) 
-6.864      
-1.196    
(.232) 
-.222       
 -1.462     
(.144) 
Regulatory Dummy 
and  
Year 3 Interaction 
1.272       
1.298    
(.194) 
.026        
2.114    
(.035*) 
13.809      
4.343    
(.000***) 
.257        
8.105    
(.000***) 
.816        
.774     
(.439) 
.009        
.283     
(.777) 
11.202      
2.195    
(.028*) 
.196        
 1.447    
 (.148) 
Regulatory Dummy 
and  
Year 4 Interaction 
.798        
.766    
 (.444) 
.004        
.328    
 (.743) 
6.400       
2.133    
(.033*) 
.082        
2.702    
(.007***) 
.483        
.418     
(.676) 
-.008       
-.225     
(.822) 
4.776       
1.025    
(.305) 
.094       
  .761    
 (.447) 
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Table 2.4: Restrictiveness Index and Deposit Insurance Characteristics 
 
Total Capital  
Restrictiveness Index 
Total Capital  
Depositor Discipline  
Tier-1 Capital  
Depositor Discipline   
Tier-1 Capital  
Depositor Discipline 
 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
 
Regulatory 
Restrictiveness Dummy 
Variable  
Does explicit  
deposit insurance 
 exist? 
Is the Insurance program 
funded by the banks?  
Is the Insurance Program 
funded by both the 
government and the banks? 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Constant 
-13.41 
-4.62     
(.00***) 
-.05 
-1.29     
(.20) 
-11.10 
-4.45      
(.00***) 
-.11 
-3.62         
(.00***) 
-10.64 
-3.86         
(.00***) 
-.08 
-1.15        
(.25) 
-10.57 
-3.83     
(.00***) 
-.06 
-.78     
(.44) 
Change in Risk 
-26.93 
-15.30     
(.00***) 
.00 
-16.72     
(.00***) 
-26.85 
-15.25      
(.00***) 
.00 
-16.61        
(.00***) 
-12.17 
-8.51         
(.00***) 
-.01 
-13.47       
(.00***) 
-11.37 
-8.29     
(.00***) 
-.01 
-13.03     
(.00***) 
Lag of Capital 
Ratio 
.27     
17.42     
(.00***) 
.22     
15.10     
(.00***) 
.27     
17.34       
(.00***) 
.22    
15.00        
(.00***) 
.28      
17.94         
(.00***) 
.31      
21.03        
(.00***) 
.29      
18.08     
(.00***) 
.30     
22.28     
(.00***) 
Log of Total 
Assets 
.45 
3.98     
(.00***) 
.00 
-1.37     
(.17) 
.47 
3.98        
(.00***) 
.00 
-1.59        
(.11) 
.53 
4.11          
(.00***) 
.00 
-1.29        
(.20) 
.52      
4.03     
(.00***) 
-.01 
-1.83     
(.07*) 
Log of Ratio of 
Liquid Assets to 
Total Assets 
-.84 
-3.48     
(.00***) 
.01 
3.07     
(.00***) 
-.89 
-3.67       
(.00***) 
.01 
3.50         
(.00***) 
-.82 
-3.21         
(.00***) 
.01 
1.85         
(.06***) 
-.80 
-3.09     
(.00***) 
.02 
2.31     
(.02*) 
ROA 
-.04 
-1.96     
(.05*) 
.00 
1.27     
(.20) 
-.05 
-2.02       
(.04***) 
.00 
1.04         
(.30) 
-.04 
-1.91         
(.06***) 
.00 
1.92        
(.05***) 
-.04 
-1.86     
(.06*) 
.00 
1.88     
(.06*) 
Log of Ratio of 
Government 
Assets to Total 
Assets 
6.57     
1.41     
(.16) 
.34 
5.84     
(.00***) 
8.35     
1.90        
(.06***) 
.28 
5.21         
(.00***) 
3.18 
.63           
(.53) 
.13 
1.00        
(.32) 
3.10 
.60      
(.55) 
.02 
.14      
(.89) 
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Table 2.4: Continued  
 
 
Total Capital  
Restrictiveness Index 
Total Capital  
Depositor Discipline  
Tier-1 Capital  
Depositor Discipline   
Tier-1 Capital  
Depositor Discipline 
 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
Capital 
Equation 
Risk 
Equation 
 
Regulatory 
Restrictiveness Dummy 
Variable  
Does explicit  
deposit insurance 
 exist? 
Is the Insurance program 
funded by the banks?  
Is the Insurance Program 
funded by both the 
government and the banks? 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Domestic Credit 
to Private Sector 
(% of GDP) 
-.01 
-.90     
(.37) 
.00 
-1.52     
(.13) 
-.01 
-.92        
(.36) 
.00 
-1.26         
(.21) 
-.01 
-1.25         
(.21) 
.00 
-1.26        
(.21) 
-.02 
-1.89     
(.06*) 
.00 
-.66 
(.51) 
Foreign Direct 
Investment, Net 
Inflows (% of 
GDP) 
.00 
.10      
(.92) 
.00 
-.03     
(.98) 
.00 
.34         
(.74) 
.00 
-.63          
(.53) 
-.09 
-.33          
(.74) 
.00 
-.40         
(.69) 
.15 
.64 
(.52) 
-.01 
-1.59     
(.11) 
GDP (Constant 
2000 USD) 
.00 
.59 
(.55) 
.00 
6.13     
(.00***) 
.00 
1.08        
(.28) 
.00 
2.55         
(.01***) 
.00 
-.36          
(.72) 
.00 
1.47         
(.14) 
.00 
-.23 
(.82) 
.00 
-.82     
(.41) 
Inflation, 
Consumer 
Prices (Annual 
%) 
-.03 
-.25     
(.81) 
.00 
-.99     
(.32) 
-.05 
-.41        
(.68) 
.00 
-.59          
(.56) 
.09 
.42           
(.68) 
-.01 
-1.12        
(.26) 
.08 
.39      
(.70) 
.00 
-.38 
(.70) 
Official 
Exchange Rate 
(LCU per USD, 
Period Average) 
.00 
.24      
(.81) 
.00 
3.47     
(.00***) 
.00 
.96         
(.34) 
.00 
2.29         
(.02***) 
.00 
-.88          
(.38) 
.00 
-.35         
(.73) 
.00 
-.80 
(.42) 
.00 
-1.25     
(.21) 
Index of 
Restrictiveness/ 
Depositor 
Discipline 
.82 
1.01     
(.31) 
-.03 
-2.48     
(.01**) 
-.95 
-.88       
(.38) 
.03 
1.86         
(.06***) 
6.05      
2.06          
(.04***) 
-.23 
-2.70        
(.01***) 
.76 
.90 
(.37) 
.06 
2.48     
(.01*) 
Note: Last rows of columns (2) and (3) represent estimates for the last two columns. Column (4) and (5) represent the depositor insurance dummy which takes a 
value of 1 if the country has depositor discipline and 0 otherwise. Column (6) and (9) represents two dummies based on the questions: Who funds the depositor 
dummy: the government, the banks or both?   
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Table 2.4: Restrictiveness Index and Deposit Insurance Characteristics (Continued) 
 
Total Capital  
Depositor Discipline 
 
Capital 
Equation  
Risk 
Equation 
 
Is the premium of 
the dummy variable 
related with risk.  
(1) (10) (11) 
Constant 
-10.71 
-4.20     
(.00***) 
-.07 
-2.36     
(.02*) 
Change in Risk 
-26.98 
-15.33     
(.00***) 
.00 
-16.80     
(.00***) 
Lag of Capital Ratio 
.27     
17.38     
(.00***) 
.22     
14.90     
(.00***) 
Log of Total Assets 
.40 
3.33     
(.00***) 
.00 
-1.59     
(.11) 
Log of Ratio of Liquid 
Assets to Total Assets 
-.83 
-3.45     
(.00***) 
.01 
3.39     
(.00***) 
ROA 
-.04 
-1.99     
(.05*) 
.00 
.99 
(.32) 
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Table 2.4: Continued  
 
 
Total Capital  
Depositor Discipline 31 
 
Capital 
Equation  Risk Equation 
 
Is the premium of the dummy 
variable related with risk.  
(1) (10) (11) 
Log of Ratio of 
Government Assets to 
Total Assets 
6.87     
 1.52      
(.13) 
.26 
4.70     
(.00***) 
Domestic Credit to 
Private Sector (% of 
GDP) 
-.01 
-.74     
 (.46) 
.00 
-3.21     
(.00***) 
Foreign Direct 
Investment, Net 
Inflows (% of GDP) 
.00 
.08 
(.94) 
.00 
-.97 
(.33) 
GDP (Constant 2000 
USD) 
.00 
1.20      
(.23) 
.00 
5.81     
(.00***) 
Inflation, Consumer 
Prices (Annual %) 
-.02 
-.13 
(.90) 
.00 
-.29     
 (.77) 
Official Exchange Rate 
(LCU per USD, Period 
Average) 
.00 
.87 
(.39) 
.00 
2.61     
(.01***) 
Index of 
Restrictiveness/ 
Depositor Discipline 
-.75 
-1.14     
 (.25) 
-.01 
-1.77      
(.08*) 
Note: The last rows of column (10) and (11) show the results of the dummy variable based on the question: Is the premium in the deposit insurance 
program tied to risk or not? If answer to the question is ‘yes’, then the dummy takes a value of 1 and if the answer is ‘no’ then it takes a value of zero.
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Appendix A – Chapter 2: Summary of Hypothesis 
 
Coefficient Variable Description Expected Sign 
Dependent Variable: 
Equation (2.7): DCAPRAT 
Change in 
Capital Ratio  
DRISK Change in Risk Negative 
ROA Return on Assets Positive 
REG_DUM 
Regulatory Dummy Variable: Takes 
value of one for undercapitalized banks, 
and zero otherwise 
Positive 
SIZE Log of Total Assets  
BONDS  Negative 
LIQUIDITY  Negative 
GDP_GROWTH   
INFLATION   
EXCHANGE_RATE   
YEAR   
Alternative Specifications 
YEAR* REG_DUM  Positive 
DEP_INS  Negative 
REG_RES  Positive 
FINV  Positive 
FDEV  Negative 
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Appendix A – Chapter 2: Summary of Hypothesis (Continued) 
Coefficient  Variable Description  Expected Sign 
Equation (2.8): DRISK Change in Risk   
DCAPRAT Change in  Capital Ratio  Negative 
LLOSS Return on Assets Negative 
REG_DUM 
Regulatory Dummy Variable: Takes 
value of one  for undercapitalized 
banks, and zero otherwise 
Insignificant 
SIZE Log of Total Assets   
BONDS  Negative 
LIQUIDITY  Positive 
GDP_GROWTH   
INFLATION   
EXCHANGE_RATE   
YEAR   
Alternative Specifications 
YEAR*REG_DUM   
DEP_INS  Positive 
REG_RES  Negative 
FINV  Negative 
FDEV  Negative 
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Appendix B. Basel Implementation Dates 
Table I: The 1988 Basel I Accord: Transitional and Implementation Agreements 
 End of 1990 End of 1992 
Total Capital Ratio 7.25% 8% 
Tier-1 Ratio 3.25% 4% 
Limit on General Provision (or 
General Loan Loss Reserves) in 
Tier-2 Capital 
Maximum 1.5 % or, 
exceptionally, up to 2% of Tier-2 
capital 
Maximum 1.5% or, exceptionally 
and temporarily, up to 2% or 
Tier-2 capital 
Limit on Term Subordinated Debt in 
Tier-2 Capital No limit (at discretion) Maximum 50% of Tier-1 capital 
Deduction for Goodwill Deduction from Tier-1 capital (at discretion) Deducted from Tier-1 capital 
 
Source: Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988. 
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Appendix B 
Table II: Adoption of the Basel I Accord 
Adoption 
Year 
Latin American & 
Caribbean Rest of the World Total 
1988 0 16 16 
1989 0 0 0 
1990 0 1 1 
1991 1 2 3 
1992 0 3 3 
1993 4 8 12 
1994 3 5 8 
1995 3 6 9 
1996 1 4 5 
1997 4 7 11 
1998 2 3 5 
1999 1 6 7 
2000 1 6 7 
2001 0 4 4 
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Appendix B. 
Table II: Adoption of the Basel I Accord 
Adoption 
Year 
Latin American & 
Caribbean 
Rest of the World Total 
2002 0 0 0 
Total 
Dated 
20 71 91 
Total 
Undated 
2 32 34 
Total 
Adopting 
Countries 
22 103 125 
Total 
Non-
adopting 
Countries 
2 9 11 
 
Source: Created by Barajas et al. (2005), based on a survey of IMF field economists; Chiuri et al. (2000); 
IMF Monetary and Financial Systems Development Regulatory Database; and World Bank online 
database on bank regulation and supervision. 
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Appendix B 
Table III: Summary of Previous Studies in the Field 
Author(s) 
(Year of 
Publication) 
Sample and Period 
Impact of 
Regulatory 
Pressure on 
Changes in 
CAPRAT 
Impact of 
Regulatory 
Pressure on 
Changes in 
RISK 
Relationship 
Between 
Changes in 
CAPRAT 
and Changes 
in RISK 
Jacques and 
Nigro (1997) 
2,570 U.S. commercial banks with assets 
over $ 100 million over 2 years (1990-
91) – First step in the implementation 
process 
+ for A 
0 / - for U 
- for A 
0 for U mostly 0 
Aggarwal 
and Jacques 
(1997) 
2,849 U.S. commercial banks with assets 
over $ 100 million over 3 years (1991-
93) – Second step in the implementation 
process 
+ for A in 93 
+ for U 
+ in 91/- in 
92-93 for A 
and U 
- in 91-92 / + 
in 93 
Ediz et al. 
(1998) 
94 U.K. banks over 25 quarters (4th 
quarter 1989 – 4th quarter 1995) + for U 0 for U Not studied 
Rime (2001) 154 Swiss banks over 7 years  (1989-95) 
0 for A + for 
U 
0 for A 
and U 0/+ 
Aggarwal 
and Jacques 
(2001) 
1,685 U.S. commercial banks with assets 
over 100 million (1991-96) 
+ for A and 
U in 91 
+ in 91 / 0 in 
92 / - in 93-
96 for A and 
U 
+ and – in 91-
92 / + in 93-
96 
 
Note: +: significantly positive; -: significantly negative; 0; insignificant; A: adequately capitalized banks; U: 
undercapitalized banks. 
Source: Van Roy (2003). 
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Appendix B 
Table IV-a: Enforcement Dates of Capital Accord 
 
In this table, we compare the adoption and implementation dates from two sources, namely Chiuri et al. (2000) with that of IMF 
working paper (2005) in columns (2) and (3), respectively. We then establish the enforcement dates, for the purposes of our study, in 
column (4). 
 
Country Year of Enforcement: Chiuri et al. (2000) 
Year of Enforcement: 
IMF Working Paper, 
WP/05/38 
Year of Enforcement 
(as Implemented in This 
Study) 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Argentina 1994 NA 1994 
Brazil  1997 NA 1997 
Chad  NA 2003 2003 
Chile 1997 NA 1997 
Costa Rica 1998 NA 1998 
Croatia NA 1998, 2002 2002 
Hungary 1992 and 1994 1992 and 1994 1994 
India  1996 1996 1996 
Indonesia  NA 2003 2003 
Italy NA 1992 1992 
Japan  NA 1993 1993 
Korea 1997 1997 1997 
Malaysia 1997 NA 1997 
Mauritius  NA 1994 1994 
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Country Year of Enforcement: 
Chiuri et al. (2000) 
Year of Enforcement: 
IMF Working Paper, 
WP/05/38 
Year of Enforcement 
(as Implemented in This 
Study) 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Mexico 1993 NA 1993 
Morocco 1994 NA 1994 
Norway NA  1992 1992 
Paraguay 1994 NA 1994 
Poland 1993 1993 1993 
Slovenia 1994 1994 1994 
Sweden  NA 1994 1994 
Thailand  1997 NA 1997 
Turkey 1994 1994 1994 
Togo  NA 2002 2002 
Uruguay NA 1995 1995 
United States NA 1990, 1992 1992 
Venezuela 1996 1996  1996 
European G10 
Countries  
NA 1992 1992 
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Appendix B 
Table IV-b. Enforcement Dates of Capital Accord  
We split the total sample given in Table IV-b into two parts, based on differences between developed and developing countries.  
 
Country Year of Enforcement: Chiuri et al. (2000) 
Year of Enforcement: 
IMF Working Paper, 
WP/05/38 
Year of Enforcement 
(as Implemented in This 
Study) 
 
Panel a: Developed Countries  
Korea 1997 1997 1997 
Japan  NA 1993 1993 
Italy NA 1992 1992 
Norway NA  1992 1992 
Sweden  NA 1994 1994 
United States NA 1990, 1992 1992 
European G1021 Countries  NA 1992 1992 
 
Panel b: Developing Countries  
Argentina 1994 NA 1994 
Brazil  1997 NA 1997 
Chad  NA 2003 2003 
Chile 1997 NA 1997 
Costa Rica 1998 NA 1998 
Croatia NA 1998, 2002 2002 
Hungary 1992 and 1994 1992 and 1994 1994 
India  1996 1996 1996 
Indonesia  NA 2003 2003 
Malaysia 1997 NA 1997 
Mauritius  NA 1994 1994 
Mexico 1993 NA 1993 
Morocco 1994 NA 1994 
                                                 
21 The G10 comprises 11 industrialized countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom 
and the United States.  
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Table IV-b. Continued  
 
Country Year of Enforcement: 
Chiuri et al. (2000) 
Year of Enforcement: 
IMF Working Paper, 
WP/05/38 
Year of Enforcement 
(as Implemented in This 
Study) 
Paraguay 1994 NA 1994 
Poland 1993 1993 1993 
Slovenia 1994 1994 1994 
Thailand  1997 NA 1997 
Turkey 1994 Same 1994 
Togo  NA 2002 2002 
Uruguay NA 1995 1995 
Venezuela 1996 Same 1996 
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Appendix B 
 
Table IV-c. Enforcement Dates of Capital Accord; 
Groupings Based on Implementation Date or Reference Year22 
 
Columns (3) and (4) present three- and four-year windows following the enforcement dates, respectively.  
 
 Countries Three-Year Window Five-Year Window 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
1992 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Norway Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, the United States  
1993-1995 1993-1997 
1993 Japan 1994-1996 1994-1998 
1994 
Argentina, Hungary, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Paraguay, Slovenia,  
Sweden, Turkey 
1995-1997 
 
1995-1999 
 
1995 Uruguay 1996-1998 1996-2000 
1996 India, Venezuela 1997-1999 1997-2001 
1997 Brazil, Chile, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand 1998-2000 1998-2002 
1998 Costa Rica 1999-2001 1999-2004 
2002 Croatia, Togo 2003-2005 2003-present 
2003 Chad, Indonesia 2004-present 2004-present 
                                                 
22 In the present study, Reference Year is also the Implementation Year.   
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Appendix C – Chapter 3: Summary of Hypothesis 
 
Coefficient Variable Description Expectation 
Dependent Variable: Equation 
(3.1): dDτ/Aτ-1 
Change in deposit divided by 
initial total assets 
 
dTCτ-1/Aτ-1 Ratio of change in total capital to 
total assets 
If coefficient is significant, then 
we find impact of changes in 
capital ratios on deposit. 
TCτ-1/Aτ-1*dTCτ/Aτ-1 Ratio of total capital to total 
assets (first part) multiplied by 
change in total capital to total 
assets 
If significant, then we find 
significant impact of changes in 
capital ratios on deposit for 
undercapitalized banks. 
 
If coefficient is significant and 
negative we find evidence of 
“credit crunch.” 
Dependent Variable: Equation 
(3.2): dLτ/Aτ-1 
Change in loan divided by initial 
total assets 
 
dTCτ-1/Aτ-1 Ratio of change in total capital to 
total assets 
If coefficient is significant, then 
we find impact of changes in 
capital ratios on loan. 
TCτ-1/Aτ-1*dTCτ/Aτ-1 Ratio of total capital to total 
assets (first part), multiplied by 
change in total capital to total 
assets 
If significant, then we find 
significant impact of changes in 
capital ratios on loans made by 
undercapitalized banks. 
Dependent Variable: Equation 
(3.3): Alternatively use EQTA, 
TOTCAPRAT, NLOANTA, 
RLOANGROWTH, ROA and NIM  
  
BASELYR Dummy variable, which takes a 
value of zero before adoption 
year and one thereafter. 
If the coefficient is significant, 
then it implies that Basel capital 
regulations had a major impact on 
these variables. 
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Appendix C – Chapter 3: Summary of Hypothesis (Continued) 
 
Coefficient Variable Description Expectation 
Dependent Variable: 
Equation (3.4): Alternatively use 
NLOANTA and RLOANGROWTH 
NLOANTA: ratio of total loan to 
total assets  
RLOANGROWTH: growth rate 
of loan  
 
BASELYR  Dummy variable, which takes a 
value of zero before adoption 
year and one thereafter 
 
RISK: Alternatively use EQTA, 
NPFRAT, RWATA 
EQTA: capital ratio; 
NPFRAT: ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans; 
RWATA: risk-weighted assets 
divided by total assets 
 
 
BASELYR* RISK Interaction term between the 
BASELYR dummy variable and 
three alternative variables to 
measure risk 
If significant, this will means that 
the Basel I Accord had a 
significant impact on the risk-
taking of banks.  
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Chapter 3. Empirical Appendix 
Table 3.1-a: Summary Statistics  
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Observations  
EQTA 0.121767 0.15666 25632 
TOTCAPRAT 17.47954 28.75076 11534 
NLOANTA 50.96548 24.56715 25373 
RLOANGROWTH 186.3817 16659.14 21149 
ROA 0.735846 6.528802 25426 
NIM 4.425397 10.23031 24774 
NPFRAT 0.037159 0.07823 11145 
RWA 106536.3 485319.5 7871 
RWATA 0.037665 2.315992 7869 
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Table 3.1-b: Summary Statistics  
 
Observation  Country 
No Of 
Banks  
Percentage 
of Total  
1 ARGENTINA 12 3 
2 BELGIUM 9 3 
3 BRAZIL 24 7 
4 CANADA 7 2 
5 CHAD 1 0 
6 CHILE 4 1 
7 COSTA RICA 4 1 
8 CROATIA 5 1 
9 FRANCE 39 11 
10 GERMANY 30 8 
11 HUNGARY 4 1 
12 INDIA 6 2 
13 INDONESIA 11 3 
14 ITALY 21 6 
15 JAPAN 24 7 
16 KOREA REP. OF 6 2 
17 MALAYSIA 6 2 
18 MAURITIUS 1 0 
19 MOROCCO 1 0 
20 NETHERLANDS 8 2 
21 NORWAY 3 1 
22 PARAGUAY 4 1 
23 SLOVENIA 3 1 
24 SWEDEN 2 1 
25 SWITZERLAND 27 7 
26 THAILAND 2 1 
27 TOGO 1 0 
28 TURKEY 11 3 
29 UNITED KINGDOM 24 7 
30 URUGUAY 6 2 
31 USA 46 13 
32 VENEZUELA 5 1 
  Grand Total 359 100 
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Table 3.2: Peek and Rosengren (1995) Model  
 
The following tables present the estimates of equations (3.1) and (3.2). Fixed effects with 
bank-specific intercepts were used to obtain the estimates.  
 
Change in Deposit Divided 
by Total Assets of Previous 
Period 1/ −ττ AdD  
Change in Lending Divided 
by Total Assets of Previous 
Period 1/ −ττ AdL  
(1) (2) (3) 
 
11 / −− ττ ATC  
 
7.060 
.343 
(.000***) 
1.489 
.120 
(.000***) 
 
1/ −ττ AdTC  
 
7.033 
.031 
(.000***) 
4.997 
.010 
(.000***) 
 
11 / −− ττ ATC * 1/ −ττ AdTC  
 
-5.977 
.094 
(.000***) 
.494 
.032 
(.000***) 
 
)log( τA  
 
.047 
.009 
(.000***) 
.017 
.003 
(.000***) 
)log( τROA  
-.021 
.022 
(.328) 
-.003 
.007 
(.681) 
CONSTANT 
-.785 
.109 
(.000***) 
-.388 
.037 
(.000***) 
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Table 3.3: Test of Change in Mean Before and After Adoption of the Basel I Accord  
Estimates for equation (3.3) are presented here. Alternate dependent variables are 
presented along different columns with name of the dependent variables in the top cell.   
 
Panel a: Year Dummies Only  
 
Dependent 
Variables EQTA 
TOTCAPRA
T NLOANTA 
RLOANGR
OWTH ROA NIM 
BASELYR 
-.014 
.004    
(.001)*** 
-1.437 
1.277 
(.261) 
.300 
.628 
(.480) 
-1668.426   
505.269   
(.001)*** 
.577 
.167 
(.001)*** 
-2.649 
.263 
(.000)*** 
t1 
.040 
.016 
(.012)*** 
1.923 
7.796 
(.805) 
2.329 
2.492 
(.930) 
1580.586   
2292.476   
(.491) 
.123 
.663 
(.852) 
3.261 
1.062 
(.002)*** 
t2 
.037 
.015 
(.013)*** 
3.783 
7.119 
(.595) 
1.680 
2.344 
(.720) 
1241.707   
2032.403   
(.541) 
.111 
.625 
(.859) 
3.968 
1.002 
(.000)*** 
t3 
.050 
.015 
(.001)*** 
5.060 
7.047 
(.473) 
1.987 
2.301 
(.860) 
1497.805   
1952.629   
(.443) 
.047 
.613 
(.939) 
4.519 
.985 
(.000)*** 
t4 
.052 
.014 
(.000)*** 
7.577 
7.001 
(.279) 
2.122 
2.271 
(.930) 
1362.057   
1920.378   
(.478) 
.393 
.605 
(.516) 
5.117 
.972 
(.000)*** 
t5 
.042 
.014 
(.003)*** 
7.140 
6.918 
(.302) 
2.988 
2.218 
(1.350) 
3776.775   
1900.712   
(.047)** 
.037 
.591 
(.950) 
3.859 
.951 
(.000)*** 
t6 
.040 
.014 
(.004)*** 
6.809 
6.928 
(.326) 
2.836 
2.232 
(1.270) 
1651.965   
1889.837   
(.382) 
-.029 
.595 
(.960) 
4.260 
.956 
(.000)*** 
t7 
.042 
.014 
(.003)*** 
6.640 
6.923 
(.338) 
2.502 
2.233 
(1.120) 
1637.852   
1889.979   
(.386) 
-.290 
.595 
(.626) 
4.464 
.957 
(.000)*** 
t8 
.048 
.014 
(.001)*** 
8.095 
6.917 
(.242) 
2.115 
2.232 
(.950) 
1614.058   
1888.524   
(.393) 
.259 
.595 
(.664) 
4.693 
.956 
(.000)*** 
t9 
.057 
.014 
(.000)*** 
9.040 
6.917 
(.191) 
3.076 
2.233 
(1.380) 
1631.418   
1889.073   
(.388) 
.245 
.595 
(.680) 
4.553 
.957 
(.000)*** 
t10 
.061 
.014 
(.000)*** 
10.802 
6.916 
(.118) 
2.160 
2.233 
(.970) 
1606.608   
1888.967   
(.395) 
-.118 
.595 
(.843) 
4.949 
.956 
(.000)*** 
t11 
.063 
.014 
(.000)*** 
11.755 
6.917 
(.089) 
1.680 
2.237 
(.750) 
1697.744   
1891.693   
(.369) 
-.631 
.596 
(.289) 
4.693 
.958 
(.000) 
t12 
.055 
.014 
(.000)*** 
10.173 
6.929 
(.142) 
2.193 
2.246 
(.980) 
1728.096   
1896.157   
(.362) 
-.060 
.598 
(.920) 
4.323 
.962 
(.000)*** 
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Panel a: Contined  
 
t13 
.065 
.016 
(.000)*** 
10.002 
7.319 
(.172) 
.467 
2.586 
(.180) 
1697.477   
2087.276   
(.416) 
.727 
.688 
(.291) 
6.518 
1.102 
(.000)*** 
t14 
-.022 
.028 
(.443)  
-4.538 
4.504 
(-1.010)  
.317 
1.185 
(.789) 
-.426 
1.946 
(.827) 
t15 
-.012 
.021 
(.583) 
-.700 
11.715 
(.952) 
-.061 
3.368 
(-.020)*** 
495.159   
3243.523   
(.879) 
.609 
.896 
(.496) 
-.417 
1.443 
(.773) 
CONSTANT 
.084 
.013 
(.000)*** 
10.178 
6.764 
(.132) 
48.359 
2.099    
(23.040) 
6.190   
1795.552   
(.997) 
.231 
.559 
(.679) 
2.395 
.902 
(.008)*** 
 
Note: Year 16 is the base year, and its dummy has been dropped from these equations.  
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Panel b: Country Dummies Only  
 
 EQTA TOTCAPRAT NLOANTA 
RLOANGR
OWTH 
 
ROA 
 
NIM 
 
BASELYR 
.009      
.005    
(.041**) 
4.690     
1.832    
(.010**) 
-1.389     
.689    
(.044**) 
-2738.185   
658.777   
(.000***) 
-5.643     
.419    
(.000***) 
-.750      
.300    
(.012**) 
d1 
-.044      
.010    
(.000***) 
-35.778     
8.314    
(.000***) 
4.943     
1.469    
(.001***) 
59.722   
1209.045   
(.961) 
-2.993     
.450    
(.000***) 
-9.558     
.628    
(.000***) 
d2 
-.154      
.010    
(.000***) 
-35.707     
3.429    
(.000***) 
-7.612     
1.575    
(.000***) 
13.573   
1298.814   
(.992) 
-1.689     
.390    
(.000***) 
-15.509     
.675    
(.000***) 
d3 
-.030      
.009    
(.001***) 
-23.393     
2.162    
(.000***) 
-5.606     
1.368    
(.000***) 
-196.884   
1126.933   
(.861) 
-3.024     
.468    
(.000***) 
-5.619     
.585    
(.000***) 
d4 
-.106      
.011    
(.000***) 
-16.809     
2.604    
(.000***) 
24.069     
1.639    
(.000***) 
42.311   
1340.215   
(.975) 
-2.268     
.383    
(.000***) 
-14.899     
.702    
(.000***) 
d5 
-.031      
.009    
(.001***) 
-33.042     
3.538    
(.000***) 
10.109     
1.341    
(.000***) 
73.290   
1101.591   
(.947) 
-2.676     
.495    
(.000***) 
-15.552     
.574    
(.000***) 
d6 
-.060      
.011    
(.000***) 
-22.439     
2.831    
(.000***) 
18.960     
1.732    
(.000***) 
-198.994   
1414.502   
(.888) 
-1.901     
.518    
(.000***) 
-12.046     
.741    
(.000***) 
d7 
-.070      
.012    
(.000***) 
-29.067     
12.736    
(.022**) 
19.773     
1.809    
(.000***) 
-333.134   
1490.006   
(.823) 
-3.061     
.381    
(.000***) 
-10.819     
.777    
(.000***) 
d8 
-.114      
.009    
(.000***) 
-36.966     
2.795    
(.000***) 
7.724     
1.330    
(.000***) 
87.249   
1093.027   
(.936) 
-3.115     
.374    
(.000***) 
-14.697     
.570    
(.000***) 
d9 
-.120      
.009    
(.000***) 
-31.710     
2.168    
(.000***) 
6.906     
1.310    
(.000***) 
65.012   
1076.895   
(.952) 
-2.213     
.389    
(.000***) 
-14.720     
.561    
(.000***) 
d10 
-.084      
.009    
(.000***) 
-26.668     
2.552    
(.000***) 
2.304     
1.353    
(.089*) 
197.312   
1112.206   
(.859) 
-2.150     
.513    
(.000***) 
-13.593     
.602    
(.000***) 
d11 
-.028      
.012    
(.019**) 
-23.451     
4.518    
(.000***) 
8.893     
1.793    
(.000***) 
-1941.793   
1493.742   
(.194) 
-2.531     
.513    
(.000***) 
-11.443     
.771    
(.000***) 
d12 
-.119     
.012    
(.000***) 
-34.252     
3.239    
(.000***) 
7.762     
1.794    
(.000***) 
74.571   
1467.621   
(.959) 
-4.612     
.462    
(.000***) 
-12.355     
.769    
(.000***) 
d13 
-.124      
.011    
(.000***) 
-23.953     
2.833    
(.000***) 
13.114     
1.613    
(.000***) 
-2281.554   
1354.858   
(.092*) 
-2.680     
.448    
(.000***) 
-13.676     
.694    
(.000***) 
d14 
-.163      
.010    
(.000***) 
-36.157     
2.257    
(.000***) 
4.478     
1.567    
(.004***) 
1255.729   
1278.885   
(.326) 
-3.182     
.392    
(.000***) 
-15.062     
.672    
(.000***) 
d15 
-.107      
.009    
(.000***) 
-30.544     
2.045    
(.000***) 
9.864     
1.372    
(.000***) 
144.024   
1130.889   
(.899) 
-3.916     
.381    
(.000***) 
-14.200     
.588    
(.000***) 
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Panel b: Contined  
 
 
EQTA 
TOTCAPR
AT NLOANTA 
RLOANGR
OWTH 
 
ROA 
 
NIM 
 
d16 
-.180      
.009    
(.000***) 
-37.104     
1.987    
(.000***) 
27.551     
1.332    
(.000***) 
87.539   
1094.522   
(.936) 
-4.037     
.480    
(.000***) 
-15.623     
.571    
(.000***) 
d17 
-.170      
.011    
(.000***) 
-37.516     
2.700    
(.000***) 
15.764     
1.677    
(.000***) 
6189.559   
1366.647   
(.000***) 
-2.750     
.696    
(.000***) 
-15.277     
.720    
(.000***) 
d18 
-.124      
.016    
(.000***) 
-34.741     
6.547    
(.000***) 
10.822     
2.410    
(.000***) 
-176.003   
1931.634   
(.927) 
-4.977     
.751    
(.000***) 
-13.799     
1.130    
(.000***) 
d19 
-.067      
.017    
(.000***) 
-31.742     
5.228    
(.000***) 
16.409     
2.691    
(.000***) 
107.814   
2211.024   
(.961) 
-2.686     
.472    
(.000***) 
-14.269     
1.150    
(.000***) 
d20 
-.131      
.011    
(.000***) 
-30.485     
2.456    
(.000***) 
18.199     
1.657    
(.000***) 
-263.942   
1345.805   
(.845) 
-2.522     
.456    
(.000***) 
-14.492     
.712    
(.000***) 
d21 
-.116      
.010    
(.000***) 
-27.745     
2.586    
(.000***) 
4.771     
1.597    
(.003***) 
50.593   
1311.589   
(.969) 
-2.767     
.577    
(.000***) 
-15.565     
.721    
(.000***) 
d22 
-.154      
.013    
(.000***) 
-35.940     
2.821    
(.000***) 
39.033     
2.015    
(.000***) 
23.630   
1628.366   
(.988) 
-1.723     
.573    
(.003***) 
-14.832     
.868    
(.000***) 
d23 
-.067      
.013    
(.000***)  
10.611     
2.002    
(.000***) 
66.329   
1688.778   
(.969) 
-2.973     
.649    
(.000***) 
-6.678     
.859    
(.000***) 
d24 
-.158      
.015    
(.000***) 
-25.152     
3.078    
(.000***) 
16.598     
2.266    
(.000***) 
105.500   
1874.794   
(.955) 
-2.716     
.577    
(.000***) 
-14.623     
.972    
(.000***) 
d25 
-.104      
.013    
(.000***) 
-31.950     
3.101    
(.000***) 
11.885     
1.991    
(.000***) 
78.563   
1631.396   
(.962) 
-2.340     
1.663    
(.159) 
-13.524     
.864    
(.000***) 
d26 
-.061      
.039     
(.113)  
17.173     
5.805    
(.003***) 
-2639.486   
4951.393   
(.594) 
-2.671     
1.461    
(.068*) 
-10.493     
2.979    
(.000***) 
d27 
-.165      
.034    
(.000***)  
14.838     
5.101    
(.004***) 
-2102.192   
4444.323   
(.636) 
-5.323     
.587    
(.000***) 
-11.495     
2.190    
(.000***) 
d28 
-.168      
.014    
(.000***) 
-35.537     
3.070    
(.000***) 
28.965     
2.051    
(.000***) 
-83.175   
1643.237   
(.960) 
-1.846     
.451    
(.000***) 
-15.761     
.880    
(.000***) 
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Panel b: Contined 
 
 
EQTA 
TOTCAPR
AT NLOANTA 
RLOANGR
OWTH 
 
ROA 
 
NIM 
 
d29 
-.099      
.010    
(.000***) 
-19.395     
3.008    
(.000***) 
-6.010     
1.575    
(.000***) 
42.724   
1312.117   
(.974) 
-2.148     
.369    
(.000***) 
-3.476     
.677    
(.000***) 
d30 
-.126      
.008    
(.000***) 
-32.552     
1.915    
(.000***) 
20.805     
1.291    
(.000***) 
102.927   
1061.695   
(.923) 
-5.700     
.513    
(.000***) 
-12.813     
.553    
(.000***) 
d31 
-.065      
.012    
(.000***)  
23.458     
1.793    
(.000***) 
257.159   
1530.403   
(.867) 
3.527      
.399    
(.000***) 
-10.757     
.770    
(.000***) 
CONSTANT 
.218     
 .009    
(.000***) 
43.921     
2.593    
(.000***) 
40.998     
1.395    
(.000***) 
2660.043   
1198.703   
(.026**) 
-5.643     
.419    
(.000***) 
18.145     
.601    
(.000***) 
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Panel c: Countries and Year Dummies (Country Dummies Not Presented)  
 
Dependent 
Variables EQTA 
TOTCAPRA
T NLOANTA 
RLOANGR
OWTH ROA NIM 
BASELYR 
-.009 
.006 
(.119) 
3.190    
2.095    
(.128) 
-.675 
.861 
(.433) 
-3068.008   
787.189   
(.000***) 
.143 
.247 
(.564) 
-.734 
.373     
(.049**) 
t1 
.039 
.016    
(.013**) 
-1.349    
7.709    
(.861) 
1.660 
2.346 
(.479) 
2822.670   
2352.075   
(.230) 
.573 
.673 
(.395) 
.881 
1.032 
(.393) 
t2 
.039 
.015    
(.008***) 
-1.143  
7.190    
(.874) 
-1.084 
2.231 
(.627) 
2304.217   
2101.273   
(.273) 
.485 
.641 
(.449) 
1.056 
.985 
(.284) 
t3 
.049 
.015    
(.001***) 
-.076    
7.117    
(.992) 
-.154 
2.203 
(.944) 
2674.010   
2041.777   
(.190) 
.454 
.633 
(.474) 
1.288 
.974 
(.186) 
t4 
.050 
.014    
(.001***) 
2.288    
7.061    
(.746) 
.130 
2.175 
(.952) 
2513.162   
2004.127   
(.210) 
.728 
.624 
(.243) 
1.716 
.961 
(.074*) 
t5 
.045 
.014    
(.002***) 
1.477   
7.004    
(.833) 
-.463 
2.135 
(.828) 
4929.041   
1984.582   
(.013**) 
.393 
.613 
(.521) 
.793 
.944 
(.401) 
t6 
.040 
.014    
(.006***) 
.393    
7.044    
(.956) 
-.338 
2.169 
(.876) 
3005.992   
1997.154   
(.132) 
.371 
.623 
(.551) 
.777 
.959 
(.418) 
t7 
.043 
.014    
(.003***) 
.823    
7.041     
(.907) 
-1.168 
2.171 
(.590) 
3010.160   
1999.698   
(.132) 
.147 
.623 
(.814) 
.885 
.960 
(.356) 
t8 
.049 
.014    
(.001***) 
1.679    
7.039    
(.812) 
-1.463 
2.171 
(.500) 
3006.281   
1999.298   
(.133) 
.673 
.623 
(.280) 
.931 
.960 
(.332) 
t9 
.056 
.014    
(.000***) 
2.466   
7.040    
(.726) 
-.659 
2.172 
(.762) 
3025.389   
1999.768   
(.130) 
.671 
.624 
(.282) 
.733 
.960 
(.445) 
t10 
.059 
.014    
(.000***) 
4.090    
7.040    
(.561) 
-1.471 
2.173 
(.498) 
3006.187   
2000.320   
(.133) 
.328 
.624 
(.599) 
.998 
.960 
(.299) 
t11 
.061 
.014    
(.000***) 
4.655    
7.045     
(.509) 
-1.849 
2.179 
(.396) 
3114.323   
2006.186   
(.121) 
-.168 
.626 
(.789) 
.833 
.963 
(.387) 
t12 
.054 
.015    
(.000***) 
3.144   
7.068     
(.656) 
-1.561 
2.191 
(.476) 
3162.618   
2013.512   
(.116) 
.423 
.629 
(.501) 
.553 
.968 
(.568) 
t13 
.034 
.017    
(.042**) 
-1.023    
7.471     
(.891) 
.575 
2.514 
(.819) 
3048.234   
2213.095   
(.168) 
1.060 
.721 
(.141) 
-.476 
1.106 
(.667) 
t14 
-.017 
.027 
(.525)  
-6.827 
4.134 
(.099*)  
.356 
1.172 
(.761) 
-.429 
1.846 
(.816) 
t15 
-.010 
.020 
(.634) 
-.603    
11.456     
(.958) 
-.126 
3.090 
(.967) 
495.709   
3242.577   
(.878) 
.619 
.886 
(.484) 
-.368 
1.369 
(.788) 
CONSTANT 
.184 
.015    
(.000***) 
42.520    
6.923    
(.000***) 
41.340 
2.304    
(.000***) 
-114.121   
2075.867   
(.956) 
3.015 
.661    
(.000***) 
17.385 
1.013    
(.000***) 
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Panel d: Fixed Effects with Bank-Specific Intercept  
 
Dependent 
Variables  EQTA TOTCAPRAT NLOANTA 
RLOAN- 
GROWTH ROA NIM 
BASELYR 
-.001    
 .003    
(.008***) 
2.832    
 1.364    
 (.159) 
-1.066 
.361 
(-1.774***) 
-5379.466    
23180.310 
(0815.220***) 
-.115 
.211 
(-.530***) 
-.563    
 .268 
(1.088**) 
CONSTANT 
.123     
.003    
 (.117) 
14.794     
1.303    
(12.240) 
51.945 
.337    
(51.283) 
-6391.393    
21916.940 
(-350.830***) 
.842 
.197    
 (.455) 
4.942   
 .250    
(4.452) 
 
 
Panel e: Financial Development Model  
 
Dependent 
Variables  EQTA TOTCAPRAT NLOANTA 
RLOAN 
GROWTH ROA NIM 
BASELYR 
.011     
 .004    
(.002***) 
3.427 
1.253    
(.006***) 
-3.965 
.579    
(.000***) 
-4103.727     
13345.070 
(.758) 
.391 
.158    
(.013**) 
-.113 
.246 
(.648) 
FINDEV 
.000     
 .000    
(.000***) 
-.054 
.005    
(.000***) 
.085 
.003    
(.000***) 
-134.054 
63.788     
(.036**) 
.001 
.001 
(.240) 
-.032 
.001    
(.000***) 
CONSTANT 
.140     
 .004    
(.000***) 
21.161 
1.238    
(.000***) 
44.635 
.569    
(.000***) 
8320.962     
12977.340    
(.521) 
.262 
.155    
(.091*) 
8.304 
.242    
(.000***) 
 
 
Panel f: Financial Development Model Without Interaction  
 
Dependent 
Variables EQTA 
TOTCAPRA
T NLOANTA 
RLOAN- 
GROWTH ROA NIM 
BASELYR 
-.001 
.002 
(.464) 
1.584 
.664     
(.017**) 
-.481 
.203 
(.018**) 
-2077.076     
1495.554 
(.165) 
.188 
.062    
(.002***) 
.081 
.128 
(.526) 
FINDEV 
-.001 
.000    
(.000***) 
-.155 
.003    
(.000***) 
-.374 
.002    
(.000***) 
10.530 
7.149 
(.141) 
-.008 
.000    
(.000***) 
-.047 
.001    
(.000***) 
FINDEV_BASELY
R 
.008 
.000    
(.000***) 
.008 
.000    
(.000***) 
.007 
.000    
(.000***) 
.006 
.000 
(.000***) 
.009 
.000    
(.000***) 
.009 
.000    
(.000***) 
CONSTANT 
.130 
.002    
(.000***) 
19.229 
.656    
(.000***) 
50.793 
.200    
(.000***) 
-767.793     
1454.359 
(.598) 
.685 
.061    
(.000***) 
6.002 
.126    
(.000***) 
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Table 3.4: Risk Sensitivity and Basel 
The results of equation (3.4) are presented below.  
Dependent Variables NLOANTA 
RLOAN- 
GROWTH NLOANTA 
RLOAN- 
GROWTH 
BASELYR 
4.248 
.689 
(.000***) 
-2279.430    
578.164    
(.000***) 
4.345 
.693 
(.000***) 
-2288.281     
607.606    
(.000***) 
EQTA 
-15.881 
3.278 
(.000***) 
-4772.352    
2890.269    
(.099*) 
-13.950 
3.247 
(.000***) 
-5266.119     
2984.837    
(.078*) 
BASELYR _EQTA 
-31.173 
3.460 
(.000***) 
4662.735    
3030.223    
(.124) 
-34.849 
3.444 
(.000***) 
5237.732     
3145.541    
(.096*) 
CONSTANT 
52.318 
.659 
(.000***) 
2364.886    
556.321    
(.000***) 
.007 
.002 
(.000***) 
-.087 
2.518 
(.973) 
INTEREST RATE  
  
.208 
.051 
(.000***) 
72.108 
41.036 
(.079*) 
GDP GROWTH RATE  
  
-.025 
.004 
(.000***) 
-.752 
5.435 
(.890) 
INFLATION  
  
52.330 
.687 
(.000***) 
2204.426     
601.618    
(.000***) 
BASELYR 
13.616 
1.169 
(.000***) 
3.359     
37.053    
 (.928) 
11.285 
1.102 
(.000***) 
12.473 
37.793 
(.741) 
NPFRAT 
34.852 
5.139 
(.000***) 
-92.619     
156.882    
(.555) 
40.786 
4.852 
(.000***) 
-55.619 
161.194 
(.730) 
BASELYR _ NPFRAT 
-14.113 
5.906 
(.017**) 
-93.644 
180.082    
(.603) 
-10.458 
5.538 
(.059*) 
-128.320     
185.547 
(.489) 
CONSTANT 
42.536 
1.148 
(.000***) 
31.748    
36.418   
(.383) 
-.583 
.018 
(.000***) 
1.584 
1.446 
(.273) 
INTEREST RATE 
  
-.094 
.069 
(.175) 
4.092 
2.405 
(.089*) 
GDP GROWTH RATE 
  
.154 
.012 
(.000***) 
-1.361 
1.646 
(.408) 
INFLATION 
  
47.764 
1.121 
(.000***) 
10.004 
38.347 
(.794) 
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Table 3.4: Continued  
Dependent Variables NLOANTA 
RLOAN- 
GROWTH NLOANTA 
RLOAN- 
GROWTH 
BASELYR 
38.212 
7.233 
(.000***) 
-90282.260    
12834.050    
(.000***) 
33.320     
 7.126     
(.000***) 
-90486.400     
12904.640    
(.000***) 
RWATA 
4847.659    
1002.155     
(.000***) 
-8355030.000    
1768576.000    
(.000***) 
4664.580     
987.421    
(.000***) 
-8382089.000    
1779629.000    
(.000***) 
BASELYR _RWATA 
-4849.160    
1002.156     
(.000***) 
8355026.000    
1768578.000    
(.000***) 
-4665.971     
987.422    
(.000***) 
8382100.000    
1779631.000    
(.000***) 
CONSTANT 
21.905 
7.231 
(.002***) 
90318.020    
12829.570    
(.000***) 
-.248     
 .076    
(.001***) 
-17.520      
136.327     
(.898) 
INTEREST RATE 
  
-.251     
 .095    
(.008***) 
22.244      
159.541    
(.889) 
GDP GROWTH RATE 
  
-.301      
.087    
(.001***) 
-.291      
155.032     
(.999) 
INFLATION  
  
28.679      
7.131    
(.000***) 
90497.760     
12908.270    
(.000***) 
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Chapter 4. Empirical Appendix 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics for chapter 4 
Panel a: Shaffer (1993) Model (1992-2004) 
 
  Total Equity Total Assets Total Deposits 
     
Mean 646058.43 7379065.01 5266561.11 
Standard Error 25500.37 296119.35 210790.18 
Count 3189 3293 3184 
 
  Interest Income Personnel Expenditure Interest Expense 
     
Mean 504155.48 53167.15 368803.13 
Standard Error 19751.19 2386.73 14935.11 
Count 3163 2878 3103 
 
  Total Liability Domestic Interest Rate Gross Domestic Product 
     
Mean 6905545.19 8.99 189556512157.73 
Standard Error 280954.99 0.08 2110472705 
Count 3293 5909 5909 
 
Panel b: Depositor Discipline Model (1996-2004)  
 
  Total Assets Total Deposits 
Loan Loss 
Reserve to Gross 
Loan 
Loan Loss Provision to 
Net Interest Reserve 
Mean 8106025.67 6152173.87 8.50 17414547.49 
Standard Error 345885.36 259475.49 0.23 3979779.27 
Count 2760.00 2684.00 2467.00 2343.00 
 
 
Loan Loss 
Reserve to 
Impaired Loan 
Impaired Loan to 
Gross Loan Total Liability Total Equity 
Mean 39812951.70 13.31 7582093.67 515129.79 
Standard Error 6867921.15 0.37 327915.60 22508.67 
Count 1780.00 1811.00 2760.00 2760.00 
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Table 4.2: Correlation Matrix  
 
Panel a: Shaffer (1993) Model (1992-2004) 
 
  Total Equity 
Total 
Assets 
Total 
Deposits 
Interest 
Income 
Personnel 
Income 
Interest 
Expendi-
ture 
Total 
Liability 
Domestic 
Interest 
Rate 
Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
Total 
Equity  1.00         
Total 
Assets  0.85 1.00        
Total 
Deposits  0.84 0.96 1.00       
Interest 
Income  0.93 0.90 0.92 1.00      
Personnel 
Income  0.82 0.91 0.93 0.87 1.00     
Interest 
Expenditure 0.93 0.83 0.85 0.96 0.75 1.00    
Total 
Liability 0.85 0.99 0.96 0.91 0.91 0.83 1.00   
Domestic 
Interest 
Rate  
-0.05 -0.14 -0.16 -0.10 -0.14 -0.06 -0.13 1.00  
Gross 
Domestic 
Product  
0.55 0.53 0.50 0.52 0.57 0.52 0.53 -0.04 1.00 
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Panel b: Depositor Discipline Model (1996-2004)  
 
  Total Assets 
Total 
Deposits 
Loan 
Loss 
Reserve 
to Gross 
Loan 
Loan 
Loss 
Provision 
to Net 
Internal 
Reserve 
Loan 
Loss 
Reserve 
to 
Impaired 
Loan 
Impaired 
Loan to 
Gross 
Loan 
Total 
Liabilities 
Total 
Equity 
Total Assets  1.00        
Total Deposits 0.97 1.00       
Loan Loss Reserve to 
Gross Loan  -0.13 -0.12 1.00      
Loan Loss Provision to 
Net Internal Reserve  
-0.02 -0.02 0.10 1.00     
Loan Loss Reserve to 
Impaired Loan  -0.05 -0.05 0.23 0.04 1.00    
Impaired Loan to  
Gross Loan  -0.10 -0.09 0.51 0.10 -0.13 1.00   
Total Liabilities  1.00 0.97 -0.12 -0.02 -0.05 -0.10 1.00  
Total Equity  0.80 0.75 -0.16 -0.05 -0.05 -0.13 0.77 1.00 
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Table 4.3: Depositor Discipline (1996-2004) 
 
  Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
  Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia Philippines Thailand  
 
Panel a: Asset Quality Proxy: Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loan Ratio ( LLRG) 
LLRG 
 0.01 0.57 0.01 0.00*** 0.01 0.00*** 0.01 0.53 0.01 0.15 
LTA 
 
 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.00*** 0.01 0.81 0.01 0.00*** 0.01 0.02** 
EQTA 
 -0.67 0.00*** -0.34 0.00*** -0.73 0.00*** -0.57 0.00*** -0.64 0.00*** 
TDTL 
 0.91 0.00*** 0.90 0.00*** 0.62 0.00*** 0.79 0.00*** 0.84 0.00*** 
_cons 
 0.01 0.47 -0.02 0.57 0.33 0.00*** -0.04 0.18 0.06 0.01*** 
  
 Panel b: Asset Quality Proxy: Loan Loss Provision to Net Internal Reserve ( LLRP) 
LLRP 
 0.01 0.97 0.01 0.55 0.01 0.75 0.01 0.74 0.01 0.30 
LTA 
 0.01 0.00*** 0.01 0.00*** 0.01 0.46 0.01 0.01*** 0.01 0.00*** 
EQTA 
 -0.63 0.00*** -0.41 0.00*** -0.71 0.00*** -0.71 0.00*** -0.58 0.00*** 
TDTL 
 0.90 0.00*** 0.86 0.00*** 0.67 0.00*** 0.70 0.00*** 0.84 0.00*** 
_cons 0.00 0.99 -0.01 0.83 0.27 0.00*** 0.19 0.00*** 0.04 0.18 
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Table 4.3: Contined  
 
  Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
  Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia Philippines Thailand  
 
Panel c: Asset Quality Proxy: Impaired Loan to Gross Loan ( ILGL) 
ILGL 
 0.01 0.41 0.01 0.00*** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.46 0.01 0.26 
LTA 
 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.61 0.01 0.00*** 0.01 0.65 
EQTA 
 -0.71 0.00*** -0.74 0.00*** -0.73 0.00*** -0.66 0.00*** -0.82 0.00*** 
TDTL 
 0.93 0.00*** 0.92 0.00*** 0.67 0.00*** 0.73 0.00*** 0.90 0.00*** 
_cons 0.01 0.76 0.08 0.00*** 0.29 0.00*** 0.11 0.00*** 0.08 0.00*** 
Paenl d:  
LLRL 
 0.01 0.75 0.01 0.00*** 0.01 0.06* 0.01 0.52 0.01 0.96 
LTA 
 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.00*** 0.01 0.73 0.01 0.01*** 0.01 0.57 
EQTA 
 -0.72 0.00*** -0.67 0.00*** -0.75 0.00*** -0.81 0.00*** -0.83 0.00*** 
TDTL 
 0.93 0.00*** 0.93 0.00*** 0.71 0.00*** 0.81 0.00*** 0.90 0.00*** 
_cons 0.01 0.59 0.09 0.00*** 0.24 0.00*** 0.12 0.00*** 0.08 0.00*** 
Note: In the table we present the estimates of equation 4.1 (reproduced below). Focus is on the coefficients of the proxies for asset quality.  If the coefficients are 
significant and negative we have evidence of depositor discipline. On the other hand, if they are not then we do not have evidence.  
)1.4.........(43210 itititititit TDTLLTAEQTATYASSETQUALIRTDEPGROW εθθθθθ +++++=  
In the above, table we do not get evidence.  
‘***’ significant at the .01 percent level; ‘**’ significant at the .05 percent level; and ‘*’ significant at the .10 percent level.  
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Table 4.4: Shaffer Model (3SLS) 
 
 
 Indonesia   Korea   Malaysia   
 
Parameter Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
A0 3663300000.0
0 0.43 
-
41352400000.
00 0.46 
-
3695140000.0
0 0.18 
 
A1 
 
-
21201800000.
00 0.38 
39911400000
0.00 0.49 
-
7062300000.0
0 0.46 
 
A2 
 -0.02 0.44 0.07 0.45 0.04 0.18 
 
A3 
 
   
104493000.00 0.38 
-
9495410000.0
0 0.49 
-
401842000.00 0.87 
A4 -87230300.00 0.53 
2530900000.0
0 0.43 856990000.00 0.13 
 
A5 
 0.11 0.38 -0.62 0.49 0.09 0.42 
 
A6 
 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.40 -0.01 0.15 
 
LAMBDA 
 0.01 0.73 0.01 0.73 0.01 0.86 
B1 
 -21.01 0.72 -9.97 0.42 -2.18 0.00*** 
B2 
 -9.35 0.72 -1.18 0.41 0.25 0.00*** 
B3 
 -0.38 0.91 -2.78 0.42 0.07 0.00*** 
B4 
 -7.82 0.69 -0.41 0.41 -0.02 0.49 
B5 
 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.83 
 
Note: As mentioned in the text, LAMBDA (equation 1.10) is the index of competition adopted from 
Gruben et al (1997, 1998, and 2003). Beta five (last row) is the dummy variable to test the structural break 
at 1996, where it takes a value of 0 before that year and 1 afterwards.  
 
)6.4.......(....................6543210 εααααααα +++++++= YZPYZPZYPQ  
)10.4.......()/()lnlnln)(/()/( 5315241321531 ξαααβββββαααλ +++−++++++−= YZDQWWQQCYZQP  
 
‘***’ significant at the .01 percent level; ‘**’ significant at the .05 percent level; and ‘*’ significant at the 
.10 percent level.  
 
 
 
 101
Table 4.4: Shaffer Model (3SLS) 
 
 
 
Philippines  
 
 
Thailand  
Parameter 
 Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
A0 
 2737210000.00 0.68 -2477920000.00 0.28 
A1 
 -14061400000.00 0.70 32912800000.00 0.36 
A2 
 -0.04 0.68 0.02 0.29 
A3 
 50367700.00 0.72 -13602900.00 0.98 
A4 
 -187742000.00 0.67 -77500800.00 0.72 
A5 
 0.19 0.72 -0.27 0.37 
A6 
 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.66 
 
LAMBDA 
 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.61 
B1 
 1.10 0.00*** -5.37 0.00*** 
B2 
 -0.27 0.00*** -2.38 0.00*** 
B3 
 -0.47 0.00*** -1.10 0.00*** 
B4 
 0.24 0.01*** -1.13 0.00*** 
B5 
 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.57 
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Table 4.5: Index of Competition and Index of Depositor Discipline Combined  
(1996-2004) 
 
 Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Panel a: Index of Competition  
BETA FIVE 
(3SLS) .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
Panel b: Index of Depositor Discipline  
Loan Loss 
Reserve to 
Gross Loan  .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
Loan Loss 
Provision to 
Net Internal 
Reserve  .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
Impaired 
Loan to 
Gross Loan .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
Loan Loss 
Reserve to 
Impaired 
Loan .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
 
Table 4.6: H-Statistics by Year: Based On OLS on Pooled Data 
 
 Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
1996 0.528172 0.26573 0.486995 0.654482 0.602894 
1997 0.635845 -0.03035 0.411681 0.482115 0.515969 
1998 0.510343 0.267491 0.316997 0.552204 -0.07948 
1999 0.366977 0.122206 0.499227 0.303658 0.105174 
2000 0.134637 0.100838 0.697793 0.266163 0.287981 
2001 0.176368 -0.01734 0.265414 0.059796 0.579978 
2002 0.444437 0.064629 0.609935 0.387675 0.934896 
2003 0.407129 0.267886 0.211135 0.368492 1.414202 
2004 NA 0.231417 -1.49969 0.602894 0.824391 
 
Table 4.7: H-Statistics by Country: Based On Several Estimation Techniques  
(Sample Period: 1996-2004) 
 
  Fixed Effect  Random Effect  Between Effect  OLS  
Indonesia 0.81 0.69 0.58 0.60 
Korea 0.49 0.48 0.00 0.26 
Malaysia 0.70 0.65 0.49 0.55 
Philippines 0.82 0.72 0.4 0.58 
Thailand 0.82 0.85 1.27 0.90 
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Appendix D – Chapter 4: Summary of Hypothesis 
 
Equation  Variable Description Expectation 
Dependent Variable: Equation 
(4.1): RTDEPGROW 
Growth Rate of Inflation 
Adjusted Total Deposit  
 
ASSETQUALITY: Alternatively 
use LLRG, LLLP, LLRL, ILGL 
(i) Ratio of Loan Loss Reserve to 
Gross Loan (LLRG); (ii) Ratio of 
Loan Loss Provision to Net 
Internal Reserve (LLLP); (iii) 
Loan Loss Reserve to Impaired 
Loan (LLRL); and (iv) Impaired 
Loan to Gross Loan (ILGL). 
If the coefficient is negative and 
significant, then we establish that 
there is depositor discipline at 
work.  
Equations (4.6) and (4.10): 
Dependent Variable (4.6): Q; 
Dependent Variable (4.10): P 
  
P Ratio of Interest Income to Total 
Assets 
 
Q Total Assets   
Y GDP in Constant Dollars   
Z Deposit Rate   
W1 Ratio of Interest Expense to Total 
Liabilities  
 
W2 Ratio of Employee Expense to 
Total Liabilities  
 
C Ratio of Total Expenditure to 
Total Assets  
 
D Year dummy is zero if year is 
before 1997, and one if it is after. 
 
5β  and λ+ 5β   If we find that the value of 5β is 
negative and large, that will 
imply that banks significantly 
increased the riskiness of its 
behavior after liberalization or 
privatization.  
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Appendix D – Chapter 4: Summary of Hypothesis (Continued) 
 
Equation Variable Description Expectation 
Equation (4.11): Dependent 
Variable: log of P 
Ratio of Gross Interest Revenue 
to Total Assets 
 
W1 Ratio of Interest Expense to Total 
Deposits and Money Market 
Funding  
 
W2 Ratio of Personnel Expense to 
Total Assets  
 
W3 Ratio of Other Operating and 
Administrative Expense to Total 
Assets  
 
Y1 Ratio of Equity to Total Assets   
Y2 Ratio of Net Loans to Total 
Assets  
 
Y3 Logarithm of Total Assets   
PR H-Statistics H = sum of 
coefficients of log of W1, W2 
and W3 variables  
  
 H<0 Monopoly 
 H=1 Perfect Competition 
 0<H<1 Monopolistic Competition 
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